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The purpose of this thesis is to model the reliability of some networked systems and 
study the related optimization problems. The reliability of a system is usually 
dependent on the structure of the system and the resources spent on the maintenance 
and protection of the system. Appropriate configuration of system structure and 
allocation of different kinds of resources are effective measures to increase system 
reliability and reduce the cost.  
      In many critical applications, fault tolerance has been an essential architectural 
attribute for achieving high reliability. However, faults in some elements of the system 
can remain undetected and uncovered, which can lead to the failure of the total system 
or its subsystem. As a result, the system reliability could decrease with the increase of 
redundancy over some particular limit if the system is subjected to imperfect fault 
coverage. Therefore the optimal system structure problem arises. The optimal structure 
of multi-state series-parallel systems with consideration of different kinds of imperfect 
fault coverage is studied. The linear multi-state consecutively connected system 
(LMCCS) is important in signal transmission and other network systems. The 
reliability of LMCCS has been studied in the past restricted to the case when each 
system element is associated with a constant reliability. In practice, a system usually 
contains elements with increasing failure rates and the availabilities of system elements 
are dependent on the maintenance actions taken. Different from existing works, the 
optimal component allocation and maintenance strategy in a linear multistate 
consecutively connected system is studied.  
vii 
 
      Besides system with internal failures, this dissertation also studies the defense of 
system subjected to external attacks. For systems under external intentional attacks, 
protecting system elements and deploying false targets are two measures for system 
reliability enhancement. The protection is a technical or organizational measure which 
is aimed to reduce the vulnerability of protected system elements. The objective of a 
false target is to distract the attacker so that genuine elements are harder to locate. 
Existing papers have studied the efficiency of perfect false targets which are restricted. 
To move towards reality, system defense with imperfect false targets is studied. One 
work studies the defense of simple series and parallel systems with imperfect false 
targets. It is assumed that the detection probability of each false target is a constant. 
Another work studies the defense of a single object with imperfect false targets by 
assuming that the detection probability is a function of the attacker’s intelligence effort 
and the defender’s disinformation effort. For systems subjected to both internal failures 
and external impacts, maintenance and protection are two measures intended to 
enhance system availability. A tradeoff exists between investments into system 
maintenance and its protection. This dissertation proposes a framework to study the 
optimal maintenance and protection strategy for series-parallel systems. The 
methodology used can be extrapolated to study the protection and maintenance of 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation focuses on the reliability modeling and optimization of some networked 
systems. The reliability of a system is usually dependent on the structure of the system and 
the resources spent on the maintenance and protection of the system. Different kinds of 
networked systems are investigated in this dissertation, which involve series-parallel 
systems with imperfect fault coverage, linear multi-state consecutively connected systems 
comprising of elements with increasing failure rates, simple series and parallel systems 
exposed to external intentional attacks, and series-parallel systems subjected to both 
internal failures and external attacks. 
      The organization of this chapter is as follows. The introductory part first provides the 
background in section 1.1, and then states the motivation of research in section 1.2. 
Section 1.3 presents some important techniques used, which include universal generating 
function and genetic algorithm. The research scope and the organization of this 









1.1. Background  
Reliability is the probability that a system will perform satisfactorily for at least a given 
period of time when used under stated condition. It is an important measure of how well a 
system meets its design objective. As many of today’s systems are large and complicated, 
the reliability analysis of such systems has drawn much attention, see Cook and Ramirez-
Marquez (2009), Yeh and Lin (2009) and Huang and Xu (2010). 
      A system is a collection of independent and interrelated components connected as a 
unity to perform some specified functions. System reliability is usually evaluated by 
reliability block diagram, which is a graphic representation of the logic connections of 
system components within a system. Some common networked systems are single 
component systems, series systems, parallel systems, series-parallel systems, parallel-
series systems, and k-out-of-n partially redundant systems. Series and parallel are the two 
basic elements of logic connections, from which more complicated configurations can be 
formed. 
      A system is said to be a series system if the failure of any element results in the failure 
of the entire system. In other words, a series system functions only when all the elements 
function. The reliability of a series system is the product of the reliabilities of all the 
components within the system. For this reason the system reliability is no more than the 
reliability of any component. And the system reliability decreases drastically with the 







      A system is said to be a parallel system if the system manages to work if at least one 
element is operational. The unreliability, one minus reliability, of a parallel system is the 
product of the unreliabilities of all the components. In contrast to a series system, the 
reliability of a parallel system increases with the number of components within the system. 
Thus parallel configuration is usually implemented in safety-critical systems such as 
aircraft and spaceships. However, parallel configuration is often restricted by other factors, 
such as cost and weight constraints. 
      There are situations in which series and parallel configurations are mixed in a system 
design to achieve functional and reliability requirements. The combinations form series-
parallel and parallel-series configurations. A series-parallel system is comprised of n 
subsystems in series with im  (i=1,…,n) components in parallel in subsystem i. The 
configuration is sometimes called the low-level redundancy design. A parallel-series 
system is comprised of m subsystems in parallel with in  (i=1,…,m) components in series 
in subsystem i. The configuration is sometimes called the high-level redundancy design. 
      A k-out-of-n system is a partially redundant system, which succeeds if and only if at 
least k (1≤k≤n) out of n components function. A series system can be regarded as an n-out-
of-n system whereas a parallel system can be regarded as a 1-out-of-n system. This kind of 
k-out-of-n systems is also noted as k-out-of-n: G systems, where G stands for “good”.  To 
the contrary, a k-out-of-n: F system, where F stands for “failure”, fails if and only if at 
least k components out of n components fail. The reliability of k-out-of-n systems has been 
studied in many papers, such as Ding et al. (2010), Tian et al. (2009), and Chakravarthy 







      As a kind of generalized k-out-of-n systems, the reliability of the consecutive-k-out-of-
n: F system has aroused a lot of attention, see Pekoz and Ross (1995) and Cluzeau et al. 
(2008). The usual definition of a consecutive-k-out-of-n: F system is a line of n 
components where the system fails if and only if any k consecutive components fail. One 
way to interpret such a system is to add a component 0 (source) and a component n+1 
(sink) to the system and that each component, if working, is directly connected to the 
subsequent k components (or all remaining components if the number is less than k), and 
that the source and sink always work. The system works if and only if a flow can be sent 
from the source to the sink. A consecutive-k-out-of-n: F system can be either a linear 
system or a circular system, depending on whether the components are arranged in a line 




1.2.1. Imperfect fault coverage 
In many critical applications, fault tolerance has been an essential architectural attribute 
for achieving high reliability (Lee and Na, 2009; Perhinschi et al. 2006; Tian et al. 2008). 
However, faults in some elements of the system can remain undetected and uncovered, 
which can lead to the failure of the total system or its subsystem (Amari et al., 2004; Xing, 
2007; Myers 2008). The optimal work sharing structure of a multi-state series-parallel 







coverage. The coverage model considered in Levitin (2008) applies only to element level 
coverage (ELC), that is, a particular fault coverage probability is associated with each 
element. In practice, there are different kinds of fault coverage models corresponding to 
different fault coverage techniques used. In order to adapt to different situations, we have 
studied the optimal work sharing structure problem with consideration of different kinds 
of fault coverage mechanisms. 
        
1.2.2. Linear multi-state consecutively connected systems 
The linear multi-state consecutively connected system (LMCCS) is important in signal 
transmission and other network systems. The system consists of N+1 linearly ordered 
positions (nodes). Each node can provide a connection between its position and the next 
few positions. The system fails if the first node (source) is not connected with the final 
node (sink). The reliability of LMCCS has been studied in the past restricted to the case 
when each system element is associated with a constant reliability (Malinowski and Preuss 
1996; Levitin 2003). In practice, a system usually contains elements with increasing 
failure rates and the availabilities of system elements are dependent on the maintenance 
actions taken (Lisnianski et al., 2008; Ding et al., 2009; Rao and Naikan, 2009). Different 
from existing works, we have studied the combined optimal maintenance and allocation 
strategy of the elements in LMCCS which minimizes the system maintenance cost 








1.2.3. Defending systems against intentional attacks 
Protecting against intentional impacts is fundamentally different from protecting against 
unintentional impacts, such as naturally occurring events or technological accidents. 
Adaptive strategy allows the attacker to target the most sensitive part of a system. Thus it 
is important for the defender to take into account the attacker’s strategy when it decides 
how to allocate its resources among several defensive measures (Azaiez and Bier, 2007; 
Dighe et al., 2009; Powell, 2007a; Powell, 2007b). For systems against intentional attacks, 
protecting system elements and deploying false targets are two important measures for 
system reliability enhancement.  
      The efficiency of false targets in defense strategy has been studied in Levitin and 
Hausken (2009a), which assumes the attacker cannot distinguish the genuine object from 
the false targets. In practice the false targets are after all different from the genuine object, 
and they are possible to be detected by the attacker. Different from Levitin and Hausken 
(2009a), we assume that there is a probability that a false target can be detected by the 
attacker. The detection probability of a false target is assumed to be either a constant or a 
function of the attacker’s intelligence effort and the defender’s disinformation effort. 
Frameworks of solving the optimal defense strategy are proposed. 
 
1.2.4. Optimal replacement and protection strategy  
Many systems contain elements with increasing failure rates and the availabilities of the 







Ding et al., 2009; Rao and Naikan, 2009). For systems containing elements with 
increasing failure rates, preventive replacement of the elements is an efficient measure to 
increase the system availability (Levitin and Lisnianski, 1999). Besides internal failures, 
an element may also fail due to external impacts, say, natural disasters (Zhuang and Bier, 
2007). In order to increase the survivability of a system element under external impacts, 
defensive investments can be made to protect the system element. A tradeoff exists 
between investments into the maintenance and the protection of system elements. For 
multistate systems, the system availability is a measure of the system’s ability to meet the 
demand (required performance level). In order to provide the required availability with 
minimum cost, the optimal maintenance and protection strategy is studied.  
 
 
1.3. Some important techniques 
1.3.1. Universal generating function 
The universal generating function (also called u-function or UGF) representing the pmf of 
a discrete random variable X is defined as a polynomial 






= ε                                               (1.1) 







      To obtain the UGF representing the pmf of a function of two independent random 
variables )Y,X(ϕ  the following composition operator is used:   
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The polynomial )z(U  represents all of the possible mutually exclusive combinations of 
realizations of the variables by relating the probabilities of each combination to the value 
of function )Y,X(ϕ for this combination. 
      The UGF is a convenient tool for evaluating the reliability and performance of multi-









jhj zpzu                                                   (1.3) 
represent the pmf of random performances of system elements ),( jj pg . If, for any pair of 
elements connected in series or in parallel, their cumulative performance is defined as a 
function of individual performances of the elements, then the pmf of the entire system 
performance can be obtained using the following recursive procedure (Levitin, 2005). 
1) Find any pair of system elements (i and j) connected in parallel or in series in the 
MSS. 
2) Obtain the UGF of the pair using the corresponding composition operator ϕ⊗           



















ϕ ∑∑= ==⊗=                     (1.4)  
where the function ϕ  is determined by the nature of interaction between the elements’ 
performances. 
3) Replace the pair with a single element which has the UGF obtained in step 2. 
4) If the MSS contains more than one element, return to step 1. 
 
1.3.2. Genetic algorithm 
In many optimization problems, the solution space is too large that an exhaustive 
examination of all possible solutions is not realistic, considering reasonable time 
limitations. As in most combinatorial optimization problems, the quality of a given 
solution is the only information available during the search for the optimal solution. 
Therefore, a heuristic search algorithm is needed, which uses only estimates of solution 
quality, and which does not require derivative information to determine the next direction 
of the search.  
The genetic algorithm (GA) has proven to be an effective optimization tool for a large 
number of complicated problems in reliability engineering (Coit and Smith, 1996, Levitin 
et al., 1998; Huang et al., 2009). Basic notions of GA are originally inspired by biological 
genetics. GA operates with “chromosomal” representation of solutions, where crossover, 







algorithms that use sophisticated methods to obtain a good singular solution, the GA deals 
with a set of solutions (population), and tends to manipulate each solution in the simplest 
manner. “Chromosomal” representation requires the solution to be coded as a finite length 
string. 
Detailed information on GA and its basic operators can be found in Goldberg (1989), 
Gen and Cheng (1997), and Lisnianski and Levitin (2003). The basic structure of the 
version of GA referred to as GENITOR is as follows (Whitley, 1989).  
First, an initial population of Ns randomly constructed solutions (strings) is generated. 
Within this population, new solutions are obtained during the genetic cycle by using 
crossover, and mutation operators. The crossover produces a new solution (offspring) 
from a randomly selected pair of parent solutions, facilitating the inheritance of some 
basic properties from the parents by the offspring. Mutation results in slight changes to the 
offspring’s structure, and maintains a diversity of solutions. This procedure avoids 
premature convergence to a local optimum, and facilitates jumps in the solution space.  
Each new solution is decoded, and its objective function (fitness) values are estimated. 
These values, which are a measure of quality, are used to compare different solutions.  
The comparison is accomplished by a selection procedure that determines which 
solution is better: the newly obtained solution, or the worst solution in the population. The 
better solution joins the population, while the other is discarded. If the population contains 
equivalent solutions following selection, redundancies are eliminated, and the population 







After new solutions are produced Nrep times, new randomly constructed solutions are 
generated to replenish the shrunken population, and a new genetic cycle begins.  
The GA is terminated after Nc genetic cycles. The final population contains the best 
solution achieved. It also contains different near-optimal solutions which may be of 
interest in the decision-making process. To apply the genetic algorithm to a specific 
problem, a solution representation and decoding procedure must be defined.  
 
 
1.4. Research objective and scope       
The purpose of this thesis is to model the reliability of networked systems with different 
structures and study the related optimization problems. The structure of this thesis is 









Figure 1.1 The structure of this thesis 
 
       Chapter 2 provides a brief literature review on the reliability of the selected systems 
and some other relevant issues.  
      Chapter 3 and 4 focus on networked systems subjected to only internal failures. 
Chapter 3 studies the optimal structure of multi-state series-parallel systems with 
consideration of different kinds of imperfect fault coverage. The components in the same 
subsystem can be allocated into different redundant work sharing groups in order to 
achieve reliability and performance requirement. An uncovered failure makes a whole 
Chapter 2 Literature review 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 8 Conclusions and future works 
Chapter 3-7 Reliability of 
networked systems 
Chapter 3 and 4 
Internal failures 
Chapter 5 and 6 
External attacks  
Chapter 7  
Internal failures and 







work sharing group fail and the fault coverage factor depends on the specific coverage 
technique used. A framework is proposed to solve the optimal allocation of components 
into different work sharing groups in order to maximize the system reliability. Chapter 4 
studies the optimal elements allocation and maintenance strategy in linear multistate 
consecutively connected systems. The objective is to minimize the total maintenance cost 
through optimal elements allocation onto different nodes when the system is subjected to 
pre-specified availability requirements. A framework is proposed to solve the combined 
elements allocation and maintenance strategy. 
      Chapter 5 and 6 focus on system defense against external attacks. Chapter 5 studies the 
defense of simple series and parallel systems with imperfect false targets. It is assumed 
that the detection probability of a false target is constant. The contest between defender 
and attacker is modeled as a two period game, where the defender moves first and the 
attacker attacks thereafter. The defender aims to minimize the expected system damage 
while the attacker aims to maximize the expected system damage. A framework is 
presented to solve the optimal attack and defense strategies. Different from Chapter 5, 
Chapter 6 studies the defense of a single object with imperfect false targets by assuming 
that the detection probability of a false target is a function of the attacker’s intelligence 
effort and the defender’s disinformation effort. A framework is presented to solve the 
optimal resource allocation into intelligence/disinformation actions and different kinds of 
defense/attack actions. 
      Both internal failures and external attacks are considered in Chapter 7, which studies 







assumed that the system consists of elements with increasing failure rates. Replacement of 
system elements can reduce their failures rates, and thus increase system availability. 
Besides internal failures, the system elements can be destroyed by external attacks, say, 
natural disasters. In order to achieve system availability requirement with minimum cost, 
the optimal trade-off between system maintenance and protection is studied. 








CHAPTER 2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
According to different configurations, networked systems can be classified as single 
component systems, series systems, parallel systems, series-parallel systems, parallel-
series systems, etc. Besides system structure, there are some other factors that have 
impacts on system reliability, such as imperfect fault coverage and external attacks. A lot 
of research has been done to study the reliability of different systems with different 
features.      
      This chapter reviews some important works related to reliability studies of networked 
systems. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 reviews the 
literatures on imperfect fault coverage. Section 2.2 focuses on the literatures related to 
linear consecutively connected systems. Section 2.3 reviews literatures on system defense 










2.1. Different kinds of imperfect fault coverage techniques 
Redundancy is widely used to enhance system reliability, especially for systems with 
stringent reliability requirements, such as nuclear power controllers and flight control 
systems (Lee and Na, 2009; Perhinschi et al. 2006; Tian et al. 2008). Usually the fault 
tolerance is implemented by providing sufficient redundancy and using automatic fault 
and error handling mechanisms (detection, location, and isolation of faults/failures). 
However, as the fault and error handling mechanisms themselves can fail, some failures 
can remain undetected or uncovered, which can lead to the total failure of the entire 
system or its sub-systems (Bouricius et al., 1969; Arnold, 1973; Xing, 2007). Examples of 
this effect of uncovered faults can be found in computing systems, electrical power 
distribution networks, pipe lines carrying dangerous materials etc. (Amari et al., 2004; 
Chang et al., 2005). 
The probability of successfully covering a fault (avoiding fault propagation) given that 
the fault has occurred is known as the coverage factor (Bouricius et al., 1969). The models 
that consider the effects of imperfect fault coverage are known as imperfect fault coverage 
models or simply fault coverage models or coverage models (Amari, 1997). Depending on 
the type of fault tolerant techniques used, there are mainly three kinds of fault coverage 
models: 1. Element Level Coverage (ELC). A particular coverage factor value is 
associated with each element. This value is independent of the statuses of other elements. 
2. Fault Level Coverage (FLC). The coverage factor value depends on the number of good 
elements that belong to a specific group (i.e., the statuses of other elements). 3. 







cumulative performance of the available group elements at the moment when the failure 
occurs.  
The ELC model is appropriate when the selection among the redundant elements is 
made on the basis of a self-diagnostic capability of the individual elements. Such systems 
typically contain a built-in test (BIT) capability. Amari et al. (1999) studied the reliability 
of different systems with imperfect fault coverage. The systems considered include 
parallel, parallel-series, series-parallel, and k-out-of-n systems. Levitin (2007a) suggested 
a modification of the generalized reliability block diagram (RBD) method for evaluating 
reliability and performance indices of multi-state systems with uncovered failures. The 
fault coverage functions considered in these papers are performed at element level. 
      The FLC model is appropriate for modeling systems in which the selection among 
redundant elements varies between initial and subsequent failures. In the HARP 
terminology (Bavuso et al., 1994), ELC models are known as single-fault models, whereas 
FLC models are known as multi-fault models. Multi-fault models have the ability to 
model a wide range of fault tolerant mechanisms. An example is a majority voting system 
among the currently known working elements, see Myers and Rauzy (2008). A system 
with three or more redundant elements can be designed to assure extremely high levels of 
coverage so long as a mid value select voting strategy can be applied. However, selection 
from among the last two remaining elements, whose outputs do not agree by an amount in 
excess of some predetermined fault detection threshold, cannot be done with the same 
high level of coverage. In this case, the redundancy management process is unable to 







management function is typically accomplished by using built-in test, as done for ELC 
systems. Since the coverage for the initial faults is very close to unity and only the one-on-
one fault has a coverage level typical of an ELC system, and, as a result, FLC systems can 
be designed to achieve much lower levels of failure probability. For this reason, most 
digital aircraft flight control systems (typically designed to have a probability of failure on 
the order of 10-7–10-9 per flight hour) are designed as FLC systems. Levitin and Amari 
(2008b) proposed a universal generating function based methodology to calculate the 
reliability of complex multi-state systems with fault level coverage.  
      The performance dependent coverage considered in Levitin and Amari (2008a) takes 
place when the fault detection and recovery functions are performed by system elements 
in parallel with their main functions. The proposed model is suitable for systems that 
cannot change the states during task execution, such as alarm systems and data processing 
systems performing short tasks. The systems usually remain in idle mode, thus fault 
detection and coverage can be performed only during task execution. When the task 
arrives, the system can be in one of various states, depending on availability of its 
elements. Therefore, the coverage probability depends only on the performance available 
at the moment of task arrival and does not depend on the history of failures.  
Due to imperfect fault coverage, the system reliability can decrease with increase in 
redundancy over some particular limit (Amari et al., 2003; Levitin and Amari, 2008b). As 
a result the system structure optimization problems arise. Myers (2008) discussed the 
optimal redundancy level of k-out-of-n systems with the consideration of both element 







parallel multi-state systems with two types of task parallelization: parallel task execution 
with work sharing, and redundant task execution. A framework is proposed to solve the 
optimal balance of the two kinds of parallelization which maximizes the system reliability 
based on the assumption that the ELC applies in each work sharing group. Myers and 
Rauzy (2008) proposed a binary decision diagram based algorithm to analyze the 
reliability of redundant systems with the consideration of imperfect fault coverage. 
 
 
2.2. Linear multi-state consecutively connected systems       
A linear multi-state consecutively connected systems (LMCCS) consists of N+1 
consecutively ordered positions (nodes) Cn, n=1,…,N+1. The first node C1 is the source 
and the last node CN+1 is the sink. The system fails if the first node (source) is not 
connected with the final node (sink). The LMCCS was first introduced by Hwang and Yao 
(1989) as a generalization of linear consecutive-k-out-of-n: F systems and linear 
consecutively connected systems with two-state elements (Shanthikumar 1987; Eryilmaz 
and Tutuncu, 2009). The basic assumptions are that the transmission range of each 
component is a random variable and the states of all the components are statistically 
independent. A recursive approach is proposed for obtaining the reliability of a LMCCS. 
The evaluation of LMCCS reliability was also studied in Zuo (1993) and Kossow and 
Preuss (1995). Zuo (1993) proposed an algorithm to evaluate the reliability of a LMCCS 







the whole system reliability. A component is regarded as irrelevant to the system 
reliability if all the previous components that can reach the component can reach farther 
than the component. A universal generating function based approach was proposed in 
Levitin (2001) for the reliability evaluation of a linear multi-state consecutively connected 
signal transmission system with consideration of the possible delay of re-transmitters. 
When the re-transmitter delay is considered, the reliability of a LMCCS is defined as the 
probability that signal can be transmitted from the source to the sink within a pre-specified 
time. 
      Due to the structure of LMCCS, the reliability of a LMCCS is not only related to the 
respective reliability/performance of each element but also largely dependent on the 
allocation of the elements onto different nodes. The problem of optimal element allocation 
in LMCCS was first formulated by Malinowski and Preuss (1996). In this problem, 
elements with different characteristics should be allocated in different positions in such a 
way that maximizes the system reliability. It only studied the case when one and only one 
element can be allocated onto each node. The near-optimal components arrangement is 
solved by recursively changing the positions of two components to maximize the system 
reliability. As proved in Levitin (2003), even for M=N, greater reliability can be achieved 
if some of the M elements are gathered in the same position providing redundancy (in hot 
standby mode) than if all the M elements are evenly distributed between all the positions. 
The LMCCS considered in Levitin (2003) allows the system elements to be allocated onto 
the first N positions arbitrarily so that some positions may have multiple elements whereas 







system reliability evaluation and a genetic algorithm is employed to solve the optimal 
element allocation strategy. 
 
 
2.3. System defense strategies against intentional attacks  
There are three measures of passively defending objects against intentional attacks: 1) 
providing redundancy (and separating redundant elements, which makes it impossible to 
destruct multiple elements by a single impact); 2) protecting the system elements (where 
protection presumes actions aimed at reducing the destruction probability of an element in 
the case of any external impact); 3) deploying false targets (which dissipates the attacker 
resources among greater number of targets and reduces its per-target effort). Measure 1 
makes the system parallel (though each redundant object may have complex structure, it 
can be considered as a single target that can be destroyed/incapacitated by an impact from 
the defender's and attacker's points of view). The protection is a technical or 
organizational measure which is aimed to reduce the vulnerability of protected system 
element. The vulnerability of each element is its destruction probability when it is attacked. 
Besides direct protections, deploying false targets is another effective measure to defense 
systems against intentional attacks. The objective of a false target, sometimes referred to 
as a decoy, is to give the appearance that the element is something else than it actually is. 
A false target conceals or distracts something else, i.e. the genuine object, which the 








2.3.1. Redundancy and protection 
The pioneering works Bier and Abhichandani (2002) and Bier et al. (2005) studied the 
optimal protection resource allocation onto different system components in simple series 
and parallel systems. Whereas Bier and Abhichandani (2002) assumes that the attacker 
will maximize the success probability of an attack, Bier et al. (2005) assumes that the 
attacker will maximize the expected damage on the system. It has proposed a revised 
objective function which incorporates the inherent values of system components. Zhuang 
and Bier (2007) studied the equilibrium strategies for both attacker and defender in a fully 
endogenous model of resource allocation for countering terrorism and natural disasters. 
Although these models have demonstrated a general approach and suggested some useful 
recommendations, these models failed to consider some important aspects, such as the 
possibility of the destruction of several elements by a single attack and the damage caused 
by partial system incapacitation.  
      Levitin (2007b) considered the defense of a series-parallel system against intentional 
attacks with protection cases. The system consists of some subsystems connected in series, 
where each subsystem contains some parallel elements. It is assumed that the elements 
within the same subsystem can be separated and protected in different protection cases so 
that a single attack can at most destroy the elements in a single protection case. The 
defense and attack contest is modeled as a two period min-max game. The defender builds 
the infrastructure in the first period assuming that the attacker will use the most harmful 







maximum system damage. A framework is proposed to solve the optimal allocation of 
different elements into different levels of protection cases, which aims to minimize the 
total expected system damage. In this paper, the optimal protection strategy is studied 
assuming that the system structure is fixed. Sometimes the defender needs to determine 
both the structure of the system and the protection strategy in order to maximize the 
system reliability. Levitin and Hausken (2008) studied the optimal resource allocation 
between deploying separated redundant elements and protecting these elements against 
external intentional attacks. In this case the defender needs to determine both the number 
of elements to construct and the number of elements to protect. Hausken and Levitin 
(2008) studied the efficiency of even separation of parallel elements. A framework is 
proposed to solve the optimal resource allocation between separation and protection of the 
system elements. It has also considered the possibility of the change of contest intensity 
after the separation of elements. Hausken (2008) studied the protection and attack 
strategies of series-parallel and parallel-series systems. The defense and attack of the 
systems are modeled as a simultaneous game. A framework is proposed to solve the 
optimal distribution of the defender’s protection resource and the attacker’s attack 
resource. Ramirez-Marquez et al. (2009) studied the optimal protection of general source-
sink networks via evolutionary techniques. It is assumed that the attacker has evenly 
distributed some attacking resource among all the links. The optimal allocation of defense 










2.3.2. Deploying false targets 
Blanks (1994) provides historical examples for the use of decoys in WWII and the 1990-
1991 Operation Desert Storm, and writes that the U.S. Army (at one point prior to 1994) 
invested $7.5M into fielding multispectral tactical decoys. Although “initially, many 
company commanders were reluctant to include the decoys in their tactical planning,” 
Blanks (1994) “concludes that decoys do enhance combat effectiveness when decoy 
employment is incorporated into the tactical scheme of maneuver.” NATO commander 
Wesley Clark publicly admits that during the 1998-1999 Kosovo war the Serbs "did 
skillfully deploy lots of decoys”. Clark points out that very few damaged or destroyed 
vehicles have been found in Kosovo. The Serbs evidently fooled NATO airmen into 
attacking false tanks made from wooden frames covered with tarpaulins or plastic 
sheeting.     
      The aim of deploying false targets is to mislead the attacker so that the genuine target 
will be attacked with less probability or less attacking effort. The efficiency of false 
targets in defense strategy has been studied in Levitin and Hausken (2009a), which 
assumes that there is a single genuine target to be protected and false targets can be 
deployed to distract the attacker. When both the defender’s and the attacker’s resources 
are limited, the defender may consider whether it is more cost effective to spend more 
resources on protecting the genuine target to reduce its vulnerability or to spend more 
resource on deploying false targets to reduce the probability of attack against the genuine 







their own utility functions. The Nash equilibrium defense and attack strategies are solved. 
Levitin and Hausken (2009b) studied the optimal resource allocation between constructing 
redundant genuine elements, protecting these elements and deploying false targets. 
Hausken and Levitin (2009) studied the optimal resource allocation in protecting system 
elements and deploying false targets in series systems. It is assumed in these papers that 
the attacker cannot distinguish the genuine object from false targets, that is, it has no 











Due to imperfect fault coverage (IFC), the system reliability can decrease with increase in 
redundancy over some particular limit (Myers 2008). As a result the system structure 
optimization problems arise. Some of these problems have been formulated and solved for 
parallel systems, k-out-of-n systems (Amari, 1997; Amari et al., 2004). Levitin (2008) 
presented a model of series-parallel multi-state systems with two types of task 
parallelization: parallel task execution with work sharing, and redundant task execution. A 
framework to solve the optimal balance of the two kinds of parallelization which 
maximizes the system reliability is proposed based on the assumption that the ELC applies 
in each work sharing group. Considering the different types of fault handling mechanisms 
in practice, the ELC model alone cannot adapt to all the cases.  
Depending on the type of fault tolerant techniques used, there are mainly three kinds 
of fault coverage models: 1. Element Level Coverage (ELC). A particular coverage factor 
value is associated with each element. This value is independent of the status of other 







number of good elements that belong to a specific group (i.e., the status of other elements). 
3. Performance Dependent Coverage (PDC). The coverage factor value depends on the 
cumulative performance of the available group elements at the moment when the failure 
occurs. The ELC model is appropriate when the selection among the redundant elements 
is made on the basis of a self-diagnostic capability of the individual elements. Such 
systems typically contain a built-in test (BIT) capability. The FLC model is appropriate 
for modeling systems in which the selection among redundant elements varies between 
initial and subsequent failures. In the HARP terminology (Bavuso et al., 1994), ELC 
models are known as single-fault models, whereas FLC models are known as multi-fault 
models. Multi-fault models have the ability to model a wide range of fault tolerant 
mechanisms. An example is a majority voting system among the currently known working 
elements, see Myers and Rauzy (2008). The performance dependent coverage considered 
in Levitin and Amari (2008a) takes place when the fault detection and recovery functions 
are performed by system elements in parallel with their main functions. The proposed 
model is suitable for systems that cannot change the states during task execution, such as 
alarm systems and data processing systems performing short tasks. When the task arrives, 
the system can be in one of various states, depending on availability of its elements. 
Therefore, the coverage probability depends only on the performance available at the 
moment of task arrival and does not depend on the history of failures.  
      In this chapter, the problem of finding the optimal balance between the two kinds of 
parallelization has been extended to the cases of FLC and PDC. Section 3.1 presents the 
model. Section 3.2 describes a universal generating function (UGF)-based algorithm for 







the optimization procedures with the genetic algorithm technique. Several numerical 
examples are shown in section 3.4 to illustrate the possible applications of the results. 
 
 
3.1. Model description and problem formulation 
3.1.1. General model and assumptions 
Consider a system consisting of M subsystems connected in series. Each subsystem m 
contains Em different elements connected in parallel. Any system element j can have kj+1 
different states corresponding to the performance rates, represented by the set 
},...,,{ 10 jjkjjj ggg=g , where jhg  is the performance rate of element j in the state h, h 
∈{0, 1,…., kj}. The performance rate Gj of element j at any time instant is a random 
variable that takes its values from gj: Gj∈ gj. The probability associated with the different 
states of the system for a given element j can be represented by the set  
                                                                },...,,{ 10 jjkjjj ppp=p                                      (3.1)  
where  
                                                               }Pr{ jhjjh gGp ==                                          (3.2) 
The state 0 corresponds to the total element failure, and other kj states correspond to the 







      The pmf of the performance of any system element j can be represented by the pair of 
vectors gj, pj. Since the element is always in one and only in one of the kj+1 states, we 
have 






jhp                                                    (3.3) 
The basic assumptions of our model are listed as follows: 
      1) The states of different system elements are mutually independent.  
      2) The elements belonging to the same subsystem can be separated into independent 
work sharing groups (WSG). The number of WSG in a subsystem m can vary from 1 
where all the elements belong to the same group, to Em where each element constitutes a 
separate group.  
      3) The available elements belonging to a WSG share their work in an optimal way that 
maximizes the performance of the entire group. In the case of detected failures of some 
elements, the redundancy management system is able to redistribute the task among the 
available elements. An undetected failure of any element belonging to a WSG cannot be 
covered within this WSG, and causes the failure of the entire group.  
      4) Different WSG belonging to the same subsystem perform the same task in parallel 








Figure 3.1 An illustrative series-parallel system with two types of parallelization 
 
      Figure 3.1 is shown for illustration. At each moment, the system elements have certain 
performance rates corresponding to their states. The performance rate of the entire system 
is unambiguously determined by its structure, and by the performance rates of its 
elements. Assume that the entire system has K+1 different states, and that vi is the entire 
system performance rate in state i. The MSS performance rate is a random variable V that 
takes values from the set {v0,…,vK}. The system structure function V=φ(G1,…,Gn), which 
maps the spaces of the elements’ performance rates into the space of the system’s 
performance rates, is determined by the system structure. In our model, the system 
structure function is affected by the distribution of elements among WSG in each 
subsystem. A real example is the data transmission system with multiple channels 

















connected in parallel in each subsystem. Each subsystem can be divided into some WSGs 
to transmit the data in parallel. If an element in a WSG fails and the failure is uncovered, 
the data assigned to the element is lost and the whole WSG fails to transmit the correct 
data.  
 
3.1.2. The formulation of elements distribution  
The elements’ distribution among WSG in each component m can be considered as a 
problem of partitioning a set Φm of Em items into a collection of Em mutually disjoint 








                                              (3.4) 
                                                                    ∅=mjmi ΦΦ I , i≠j                                     (3.5)      
Each set Φmi can contain from 0 to Em elements. The partition of the set Φm can be 
represented by the vector αm={αmj, 1≤j≤Em}, where αmj is the index of the subset to which 
element j belongs. 
      Concatenation of vectors α={α1,…, αM} determines the distribution of elements 
among the WSG for the entire system. For any given α, and given pmf of the system 
elements, one can obtain the pmf of the entire system performance V in the form 








3.1.3. The formulation of system reliability  
The acceptability of a system state can usually be defined by the acceptability function 
f(V,θ*), representing the desired relation between the system performance V, and some 
limit value named system demand (f(V,θ*)=1 if the system performance is acceptable, and 
f(V,θ*)=0 otherwise). The MSS reliability is defined as its expected acceptability, the 
probability that the MSS satisfies the demand (Levitin, 2005). Having the pmf of system 
performance (3.6), one can obtain its reliability as 







=                                       (3.7) 
      For example, in applications where the system performance is defined as a task 
execution time, and θ*= T* is the maximum allowed task execution time, (3.7) takes the 
form                  







                                     (3.8) 
whereas in applications where the system performance is defined as its 
productivity/capacity, and θ*= C* is the minimum allowed capacity, (3.7) takes the form                  
















3.1.4. The formulation of the entire problem  
The problem of solving the optimal elements allocation strategy in a multi-state series-
parallel system with imperfect fault coverage is formulated as follows.  
      Find vector α*(θ*)={α1,…, αM}, which maximizes the multi-state system reliability 
R(θ*) for a given demand θ*, 
                                                        )}.,(max{arg)( *** θθ αα R=                                 (3.10) 
 
 
3.2. Evaluating reliability of series-parallel MSS with uncovered 
failures 
3.2.1. Incorporating uncovered failures in WSG into the UGF technique 










hX zzu ε                                              (3.11) 







      To obtain the UGF representing the pmf of a function of two independent random 





                 

































                             (3.12) 
The polynomial U(z) represents all of the possible mutually exclusive combinations of 
realizations of the variables by relating the probabilities of each combination to the value 
of function ϕ(X, Y) for this combination. 
 
A.  The UGF of a WSG in the case of FLC 
In the case when multi-fault coverage takes place in each WSG, one needs to incorporate 
the coverage probabilities depending on the number of failed elements into the 
performance distribution of any WSG. Thus one has to know not only entire group 
performance but also the total number of failed elements in each state of this group 
(combination of states of its elements). To obtain both these indices, the performance 
distribution for system elements is described by a modified UGF as 















where jhs  represents the realization of the random number of failed elements in state h. 













jj zpzpzu                               (3.14) 
where 0jg  corresponds to the case of failure of the element (1 failure), jhg  (1≤j≤kj) 
corresponds to the h-th working state of element j (0 failure). 
      Applying the operator                                                               


















∑∑=⊗=             (3.15) 











)(                                     (3.16) 
that represents the distribution of the number of failed elements and the corresponding 
performance of the WSG. Here w is the performance composition function for elements 
connected in parallel with work sharing, Pmih is the probability that WSG i in subsystem m 
contains exactly smih failed elements and functions at the performance level gmih given all 
the failures are covered (gmi0 correspond to the failures of all the elements in the group).  
     We assume that the coverage probability of a failure is determined by the total number 
of elements in the WSG and the number of failed elements in this group (which affects the 







case of j-th failure in WSG i in subsystem m (when j-1 elements are already unavailable), 
and rmi(k) be the probability that the group does not fail after k failures have consecutively 
occurred. It can be seen, that 







=                                     (3.17) 
By definition 1)0()0( == |,|Φcr mimmi  and 0),( =||Φ||Φc mimim . 
      The unconditional probability that the WSG i in subsystem m can work with 
performance gmih  (h=1,…,nmi) after smih  elements have failed is  







= Φ                         (3.18) 
Thus the uncovered failures can be incorporated into the UGF by applying the following 
operator ε:   
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B.  The UGF of a WSG in the case of PDC 
In the case that the coverage probability of a WSG depends on the entire performance of 
the group, one can use )(gl im  to denote the fault coverage probability of WSG i in 
subsystem m in the case the entire performance of the group is g. By definition we have 
)0(iml =0. The uncovered failures can be incorporated into the UGF by applying the 
following operator:  

































               (3.20) 
This UGF represents the unconditional distribution of performance of entire WSG i in 
subsystem m. 
 
C.  The UGF of a subsystem 
Applying (3.12) with ϖϕ ≡                                                               
                                                   )()()(},{ zUzUzU mjmimjmi ϖ⊗=                                      (3.21) 

















Here ϖ  is the performance composition function for elements connected in parallel 
without work sharing, Pmh is the probability that the performance of subsystem m equals to 
gmh.  
 
D.  The UGF of the entire system 
Applying (3.12) with πϕ ≡                                                               
                                                    )()()(},{ zUzUzU lmlm π⊗=                                         (3.23) 









 )(                                          (3.24) 
Here π  is the performance composition function for elements connected in series, Ph is 
the probability that the performance of the entire system equals to gh.  
      From the UGF Us(z) representing the pmf of the entire MSS performance (3.6), the 
system reliability can be obtained using (3.7). 
 
3.2.2. Performance composition functions 
The choice of functions φ depends on the type of connection between the elements, and on 







redundant parallel connection without work sharing ( ϖϕ ≡ ), for parallel connection with 
work sharing ( ωϕ ≡ ), and for series connection ( πϕ ≡ ). 
      Consider, for example, a task processing with performance defined as task completion 
time. Assume that each element j can complete the task by random time Gj, the case of 
total failure of the element corresponds to Gj=∞. If two elements i and j perform the same 
task in parallel, providing task execution redundancy, then the task completion time is 
equal to the time when the fastest element completes the task. The performance of the pair 
of elements in this case is determined by the function 
                                                        ).,min(),( jiji GGGG =ϖ                                       (3.25) 
As shown in Levitin (2005), if two parallel elements can share the work by dividing the 
task in proportion to their processing speed, the task completion time for the pair of 
elements is determined by the function 
.
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GGω                   (3.26) 
If two elements consecutively execute different subtasks, represented by series connection 
of the elements, the entire task completion time for the pair of elements is equal to the sum 
of their individual execution times. The performance of the pair of elements in this case is 
determined as 







      Another example is a data transmission system with performance defined as 
transmission capacity (bandwidth). Assume that each element j has a random data 
transmission capacity Gj, the case of total failure of the element corresponds to Gj=0. If 
two elements i and j transmit the same data, providing data transmission redundancy, the 
transmission capacity of the pair of elements is determined by the element with greater 
performance. The performance of the two elements is determined by the function 
                                                        ).,max(),( jiji GGGG =ϖ                                (3.28) 
If the parallel elements share their work, then the entire capacity that they provide is equal 
to the sum of their individual capacities. The performance of the two elements is 
determined by the function 
                                                           .),( jiji GGGG +=ω                                           (3.29) 
If data flow is transmitted by two consecutive elements, the bandwidth of the slowest 
element becomes the bottleneck of the system. Therefore, the performance of the two 
elements is determined by the minimum of their individual performances, 











3.3. Optimization technique 
Equation (3.10) formulates a complicated combinatorial optimization problem. An 
exhaustive examination of all possible solutions is not realistic, considering reasonable 
time limitations. The genetic algorithm (GA) has proven to be an effective optimization 
tool for a large number of complicated problems in reliability engineering, and it is used 
for our optimization.  
 
3.3.1. Solution representation 








 items corresponding to elements composing the entire system. In our GA, 







, item si 
of the string corresponds to item αmj of the vector α, and determines the number of WSG 
to which the j-th element of the m-th subsystem belongs. Therefore, all the items si of the 














1 ), should vary in the range 
(1, Em). Because the random solution generation procedure can produce strings with 
elements randomized within the same range, to provide solution feasibility one must use a 
transformation procedure that makes each string element belonging to the proper range. 
This procedure determines the value of αmj as 1+modEm(si). The range of values produced 















3.3.2. Solution decoding procedure  
The following procedure determines the fitness value for an arbitrary solution defined by 
integer string S={s1,s2,…sn}. 
1) For each subsystem m=1,…,M: 
      1.1. Determine the number of WSG for each element of the m-th component:  
                                               ,1),(mod1 mjcEmj Ejsm ≤≤+= +α                            (3.31) 









       1.2. For each WSG i (1≤i≤Em), create set Φmi using the recursive procedure 
                                                            Φmi =Ø, for i=1,…, Em: 
                                                       if αmj=i,  }.{ jcΦΦ mimi += U                            (3.32) 
2) Determine the system reliability by the algorithm presented in section 3.2. Assign 










3.3.3.  Crossover and mutation procedures  
The cross operator for given parent strings P1, P2 and the offspring string O is defined as 
follows: the i-th element (1≤i≤n) of the string O is equal to the i-th element of either P1 or 
P2 both with probability 0.5. 




3.4. Illustrative examples 
Consider a data transmission system consisting of two consecutive multi-channel 
communication lines. Each channel can have failure state with zero transmission capacity 
and two working states with full and reduced transmission capacity. The distributions of 
the performances (transmission capacities) of channels are presented in Table 3.1.  
      Any subset of channels belonging to the same line can compose a WSG in which the 
data packages are divided into sub-packages transmitted by different channels. Undetected 
failures within any WSG remain uncovered. Depending on system monitoring architecture 
the probability of failure detection can be represented by different functions of number of 








Table 3.1 Performance distributions of data transmission channels 

















1 0.15 0 0.7 10 0.15 20 
2 0.15 0 0.65 12 0.20 20 
3 0.20 0 0.60 15 0.20 25 
4 0.15 0 0.60 18 0.25 25 
5 0.15 0 0.70 14 0.15 20 





7 0.20 0 0.50 20 0.30 30 
8 0.20 0 0.60 12 0.20 25 
9 0.20 0 0.60 14 0.20 24 
10 0.20 0 0.70 15 0.10 25 
11 0.15 0 0.65 20 0.20 30 
12 0.15 0 0.70 12 0.15 20 




14 0.25 0 0.65 10 0.10 20 
 
A. FLC example 1 
In some occasions the load on monitoring system is proportional to the number of failed 
elements because it performs failure detection and monitoring actions and these actions 
are much more time consuming than monitoring the available elements. In this case it is 
reasonable to assume that )( |,j|Φc mim  depends only on j when 1|1 −≤≤ mi|Φj . As an 
illustration we assume that the coverage (detection) probability of j-th failure in WSG i in 












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 0 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
2 - 0 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 
3 - - 0 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 
4 - - - 0 0.22 0.22 0.22 
5 - - - - 0 0.15 0.15 
6 - - - - - 0 0.08 
7 - - - - - - 0 
 
      Different WSG of the same line transmit the same data in parallel. The system 
transmission capacity should be greater than C*. The system corresponds to the flow 
transmission model with composition functions (3.28)–(3.30), and reliability defined 
according to (3.9). The problem is to find the optimal system configuration (distribution of 
the channels among the WSGs) that can provide certain system transmission capacity C* 








Table 3.3 Parameters of solutions in FLC example 1 
 No sharing C*=20 C*=30 C*=40 No 
redundancy
Max capacity 30 70 89 90 164 
R(0) ≈1.0 0.9996 0.9961 0.9958 0.6865 
R(20) 0.3640 0.9932 0.9915 0.9909 0.6865 
R(30) 0.0 0.9113 0.9834 0.9601 0.6865 






























Table 3.3 contains the optimal system configurations for C*=20 Kb/sec, C*=30 Kb/sec, 
and C*=40 Kb/sec obtained using the GA and characteristics of the corresponding 
transmission systems. This table also contains the characteristics of the system without work 
sharing, when all of the channels transmit the same data, and the characteristics of the system 
without redundancy, when all the channels within each line belong to a single WSG. Table 







totally R(0), reliabilities for different values of C*, and the system structure. The system 
without work sharing has the greatest reliability R(0); however, it is not able to provide 
capacity greater than 30Kb/sec. On the contrary, the system without redundancy has the 
greatest possible performance of 164Kb/sec, but very low reliability. The structures optimal 
for different demands have intermediate values of maximal possible capacity, and R(0), 
while providing the greatest reliabilities R(C*). 
      The system reliabilities as functions of the minimum allowed transmission capacity for 
all the five cases are presented in Figure 3.2. 
 



















Figure 3.2  Function R(C*) for obtained configurations of the data transmission system in 










B. FLC example 2 
In some occasions the load on monitoring system is proportional to the number of 
available elements because it switches the failed elements off and does not monitor them. 
In this case it is reasonable to assume that )( |,j|Φc mim  depends on |mi|Φ - j when 
1|1 −≤≤ mi|Φj .  
 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 0 0.99 0.63 0.36 0.22 0.15 0.08 
2 - 0 0.99 0.63 0.36 0.22 0.15 
3 - - 0 0.99 0.63 0.36 0.22 
4 - - - 0 0.99 0.63 0.36 
5 - - - - 0 0.99 0.63 
6 - - - - - 0 0.99 








      As an illustration we assume that the coverage probability of the j-th failure in WSG i 
in any subsystem m decreases with |mi|Φ  and increases with j as given in Table 3.4. Table 
3.5 contains the optimal system configurations for C*=20Kb/sec, C*=30Kb/sec, and 
C*=40Kb/sec obtained using the GA and characteristics of the corresponding transmission 
systems. 
 
Table 3.5 Parameters of solutions in FLC example 2 
 No sharing C*=20 C*=30 C*=40 No 
redundancy
Max capacity 30 60 65 74 164 
R(0) ≈1.0 0.9998 0.9998 0.9894 0.0952 
R(20) 0.3640 0.9772 0.9733 0.9375 0.0952 
R(30) 0.0 0.8461 0.9405 0.8656 0.0952 









































      The system reliabilities as functions of the minimum allowed transmission capacity for 
all the five cases are presented in Figure 3.3. 
 



















Figure 3.3 Function R(C*) for obtained configurations of the data transmission system in 
FLC example 2 
 
      Comparing the solutions presented in Table 3.3 and Table 3.5 one can see that in the 
case when the coverage probability in a WSG decreases with the increase of total number 








C. FLC example 3 
In some occasions the monitoring system uses voting among the remaining components to 
detect failures. In this case it is reasonable to assume that )( |,j|Φc mim  is determined by the 
number of remaining components. When there are at least 3 remaining components 
available, the coverage factor )( |,j|Φc mim  can be regarded as 1. When there are only 2 
remaining components, the monitoring system can no longer use voting to detect failures. 
In this case, failures can only be detected through built-in test (BIT) technology for each 
component with limited success probability. As an illustration we assume that the 
coverage probability of the j-th failure in WSG i in any subsystem m is as given in Table 
3.6.  
      Table 3.7 contains the optimal system configurations for C*=20Kb/sec, C*=30Kb/sec, 
and C*=40Kb/sec obtained using the GA and characteristics of the corresponding 
















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 0 0.9 1 1 1 1 1 
2 - 0 0.9 1 1 1 1 
3 - - 0 0.9 1 1 1 
4 - - - 0 0.9 1 1 
5 - - - - 0 0.9 1 
6 - - - - - 0 0.9 
7 - - - - - - 0 
 
      Table 3.7 shows that in this case single WSG consisting of all elements is preferred in 











Table 3.7 Parameters of solutions in FLC example 3 
 No sharing C*=20 C*=30 C*=40 No 
redundancy
Max capacity 30 164 164 164 164 
R(0) ≈1.0 ≈1.0 ≈1.0 ≈1.0 ≈1.0 
R(20) 0.3640 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 
R(30) 0.0 0.9982 0.9982 0.9982 0.9982 





























       The system reliabilities as functions of the minimum allowed transmission capacity 
























Figure 3.4 Function R(C*) for obtained configurations of the data transmission system in 
FLC example 3 
 
D. PDC example 
In the case when the fault detection and recovery functions in a WSG are performed by 
the system elements in the WSG, it is reasonable to assume that the fault coverage 
probability of a WSG depends on the entire group performance. As an example we assume 
that the fault coverage probability takes the form 0.01g} ,1min{)( =gl im . Table 3.8 
contains the optimal system configurations for C*=20Kb/sec, C*=30Kb/sec, and 









Table 3.8 Parameters of solutions in PDC example 
 No sharing C*=20 C*=30 C*=40 No 
redundancy
Max capacity 30 50 65 164 164 
R(0) 1.0 0.9937 0.9621 0.8336 0.8336 
R(20) 0.3640 0.9651 0.9486 0.8335 0.8335 
R(30) 0.0 0.6217 0.9353 0.8331 0.8331 
































      It can be seen from Table 3.8 that although the fault coverage probability function 
equals to 1 when g is greater than 100, small WSGs are preferred in the cases C*=20 and 
C*=30. This is because redundancy prevents system failure even in the case, when the 







      The system reliabilities as functions of the minimum allowed transmission capacity for 
all the five cases are presented in Figure 3.5. 
 
























This chapter extends the problem of finding optimal balance between redundancy and task 
sharing in multi-state systems with uncovered failures to the cases of multi-fault coverage 
and performance dependent coverage. It is assumed that the uncovered failures in the 







entire group. Due to different fault covering mechanisms, the probability of such failure 
can be determined by different factors, such as the number of working elements in the 
group when the failure occurs, the number of failed elements in the group when the failure 
occurs, and the entire group performance. The procedures of finding the optimal system 
structure (distribution of different parallel elements among work sharing groups) have 
been described. The illustrative examples show the results obtained by the optimization 
algorithm for a data transmission system with performance defined as transmission 
capacity. Various assumptions of coverage factors are discussed to illustrate the 
application of the procedures in the cases of different fault covering mechanisms. It was 
shown that the greatest system reliability (defined as a probability of meeting a certain 







CHAPTER 4 RELIABILITY OF LINEAR MULTI-STATE 
CONSECUTIVELY CONNECTED SYSTEMS  
 
 
The linear multi-state consecutively connected system (LMCCS) consists of N+1 
consecutively ordered positions (nodes) Cn, n=1,…,N+1. The first node C1 is the source 
and the last node CN+1 is the sink. At each position, elements from a set E={e1,…,eM} can 
be allocated to provide a connection between the position in which it is allocated and the 
next few positions. The system fails if the first node (source) is not connected with the 
(N+1)th node (sink). Each system element ei in working state can connect the node it is 
located at with gi next nodes. Each element is also characterized by its lifetime distribution 
with an increasing failure rate. 
      An example of the LMCCS is a set of radio relay stations with a transmitter allocated 
at C1 and a receiver allocated in CN+1. Each station Cn (2≤n≤N) can have retransmitters 
generating signals that reach the next few stations. The farthest station that can be reached 
by a station depends on the amplifier power of the retransmitters allocated on the station 
and on the random signal propagation conditions. The aim of the system is to provide 







      The LMCCS was first introduced by Hwang and Yao (1989) as a generalization of 
linear consecutive-k-out-of-n: F systems and linear consecutively connected systems with 
two-state elements (Shanthikumar 1987; Eryilmaz and Tutuncu, 2009). The evaluation of 
LMCCS reliability was studied in Hwang and Yao (1989), Zuo (1993) and Kossow and 
Preuss (1995). Due to the structure of LMCCS, the reliability of a LMCCS is not only 
related to the respective reliability/performance of each element but also largely dependent 
on the allocation of the elements onto different nodes. The problem of optimal element 
allocation in LMCCS was first formulated by Malinowski and Preuss (1996). In this 
problem, elements with different characteristics should be allocated in different positions 
in such a way that maximizes the system reliability. It only studied the case when one and 
only one element can be allocated onto each node. As proved in Levitin (2003), even for 
M=N, greater reliability can be achieved if some of the M elements are gathered in the 
same position providing redundancy (in hot standby mode) than if all the M elements are 
evenly distributed between all the positions. In these works, the reliability of each element 
is assumed to be constant.  
      In practice, system elements usually fail with increasing failure intensity due to wear, 
rotting, deterioration, or aging effects (Lisnianski et al., 2008; Ding et al., 2009; Rao and 
Naikan, 2009; Wu et al., 2010). For systems containing elements with increasing failure 
rates, preventive replacement of the elements is an efficient measure to increase the 
system reliability (Nakagawa and Mizutani, 2009; Ambani et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2010). 
Replacing elements that have a high risk of failure, while reducing the chance of failure, 
can incur significant expenses, especially in systems with high replacement rates. Minimal 







failure, but does not affect its hazard rate (Beichelt and Fischer, 1980; Zhang and Jardine, 
1998; Sheu and Chang, 2010). Since the element replacement reduces its failure rate, the 
more frequently an element is replaced the higher the availability of the element is. 
Therefore there is a trade-off between the availability of the system and the total system 
maintenance cost. Since the reliability of a LMCCS can be comprehensively increased by 
adjusting the positions of system elements, this property can also be utilized to reduce the 
maintenance cost needed for the system to meet availability requirement. 
     In this chapter, the combined maintenance and allocation problem is studied. Different 
from Malinowski and Preuss (1996) and Levitin (2003), the objective of element 
allocation is to minimize the maintenance cost subject to a pre-specified system 
availability requirement. Section 4.1 formulates the problem. Section 4.2 describes the 
universal generating function technique used for evaluating the LMCCS availability. A 
genetic algorithm is adopted for optimization in section 4.3. Illustrative examples are 
presented in section 4.4. 
 
 
4.1. Problem formulation 
4.1.1. General model and assumptions 
The LMCCS consists of N+1 consecutively ordered positions (nodes) Cn, n=1,…,N+1. 







E={e1,…,eM} can be allocated to provide a connection (also called path or arc) between 
the position in which it is allocated and the next few positions. For each element ei located 
at node j the connection of this node with nodes j+1,…, j+gi is provided in the working 
state. The expected number of failures of element ei during time interval (0,t] is denoted as 
)(tiλ , which is an increasing function of t. It is assumed that the following two kinds of 
maintenance actions can be taken (Feldman and Chen, 1996; Sheu and Chang, 2009): 
     1) Preventive replacement. The i-th element is replaced when it reaches an age Ti. The 
cost cpi of each replacement is constant. The average time for each replacement of element 
i is tpi.      
    2) Minimal repair. This action is used when the element fails between two consecutive 
replacements. Minimal repair resumes the failed element to work without affecting its 
hazard function. The average cost for a minimal repair of element i is cmi. The average 
time for a minimal repair of element i is tmi.        
      Another important assumption is that repair and replacement times are significantly 
shorter than the time periods between failures.  
 
4.1.2. The formulation of system maintenance cost 
The expected total maintenance cost for an element during the system life cycle is the total 
expected preventive replacement cost and minimal repair cost for the element. The 



















Tn  is the number of preventive replacements during the system life cycle 
for element i, and li is the expected minimal repair cost for element i. 
      The average number of failures during the period between replacements λi(Ti) can be 
obtained by using the replacement interval Ti  for each element. Furthermore, the total 










λλ =+                                            (4.2) 
From (4.2), we can obtain the availability of element i as 






 −−−= )()1/(                                  (4.3) 
and the expected minimal repair cost for element i as 






)(λ=                                                  (4.4) 
From (4.1) and (4.4), we can obtain the expected total maintenance cost during the system 
life cycle as 






















4.1.3. The formulation of elements allocation 
The elements allocation problem can be considered as a problem of partitioning a set E of 
M elements into N mutually disjoint subsets En (1≤n≤N) such that 







U                                                     (4.6) 
                                                             ji ,  E j ≠= ΦIiE                                             (4.7) 
where each set Ei corresponds to LMCCS node Ci and can contain from 0 to M elements. 
The partition of the set E can be represented by the vector H={h(i),1≤i≤M}, where h(i) 
denotes the number of the subset to which element i belongs. The cardinality of each 
subset Ei can be easily obtained as 







i ijhE                                             (4.8) 
 
4.1.4. The combined optimization problem     
The combined element allocation and maintenance optimization problem is to find the 
optimal positions and replacement intervals for the system elements which minimize the 
total system maintenance cost subject to a pre-specified system availability requirement. 
The general formulation of the problem can be presented as follows: 





















T)  H,T  H,
λ
     
(4.9) 
where A* is some preliminary specified system availability requirement. 
 
 
4.2. LMCCS availability estimation based on a universal generating 
function 
The universal generating function (UGF) was introduced in Ushakov (1986) and proved to 
be extremely effective in evaluating reliability of complex multi-state systems. Much 
research has been done on incorporating UGF into reliability analysis of various k-out-of-
n systems, series-parallel systems, weighted voting systems, acyclic information networks, 
and manufacturing systems (Ding et al. 2010; Li et al. 2010; Yeh, 2009; Youssef and 











kzpzu                                             (4.10) 
where the variable X has K possible values and pk is the probability that X takes the value 
xk.    








4.2.1. UGF for group of elements allocated at the same position 
Consider element ei located as position Cn. When the element is available, it connects the 
n-th node with the (n+1)-th, the (n+2)-th ,…, and the θ(n+gi)-th node, where 
θ(n+gi)=min{n+gi,N+1}. When the element is unavailable, it is not able to connect the n-
th node with any further remote positions. Thus the states of the element can be 
represented by the following UGF 









inhzpzu                                              (4.11) 
where H=2, ).(  ,  ,  ),1( 2211 iiniininiin gnkApnkAp +===−= θ  
      Let random value Tn be the number of the most remote position which can be reached 
by elements allocated on node Cn. When there are multiple elements allocated on Cn, the 
most remote position to which Cn can be connected is determined by the available element 
which has the greatest connecting range. To capture this feature, the following 
composition operator 
max
⊗  is used to obtain the combined UGF of a pair of elements        



















jnlinhjnlinh zppzpzpzuzu        (4.12) 
One can see that the operator 
max
⊗  satisfies the following conditions: 
))(),(())(),((
maxmax
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zuzuzuzuzuzu knjninknjnin ⊗⊗=⊗⊗            (4.14) 
Therefore, the UGF un(z) for the group of elements allocated at Cn can be obtained by 
sequentially applying the composition operator 
max
⊗ .    
      In the case when node n contains no elements, no arc exists from Cn to any other node. 
In this case, the corresponding un(z) takes the form 
                                                       .)( nn zzu =                                                        (4.15) 
 
4.2.2.  UGF for the entire LMCCS 
Let random value Yn be the number of the farthest position that can be reached by the 
elements allocated at the first n positions. The probabilistic distribution of Yn is denoted by 
u- function Un(z). According to the definitions of Tn and Yn, it can be seen that Y1=T1 and 
U1(z)=u1(z). 
      For an arbitrary pair of adjacent positions Cn and Cn+1, the paths provided by the 
elements belonging to the first n nodes can be continued by the elements allocated at 
position n+1 only if Yn≥n+1 (the path reaches Cn+1). If this condition is satisfied, the most 
remote position that can be reached by elements allocated on the first n+1 positions can be 







     In order to consider only the combinations of states of elements from the first n 
positions which make the path from C1 to Cn+1 exist, the following φ operator is used to 
















njn zqzqzU φφ                                 (4.16) 
Having the distributions of Yn and Tn+1, represented by Un(z) and un+1(z) respectively, the 
UGF Un+1(z) representing distribution of Yn+1 can be determined as 
))()),((()( 11 max zuzUzU nnn ++ ⊗= φ                                          (4.17)      
By sequentially applying (4.17), one can obtain UN(z) containing two terms corresponding 
to YN=N and YN=N+1. ))(( zU Nφ  has only one term corresponding to the probability that 
the path from C1 to CN+1 exists. The coefficient of this term is equal to LMCCS 
availability A. 
 
4.2.3. Computational complexity analysis 
Since the farthest position that can be connected by each element i allocated at node Cn 
has at most N+2-n states (from n to N+1), combining UGF of any pair of elements 
allocated at node Cn by (4.12) has a computational complexity ).( 2NΟ  As the number of 
elements allocated at node Cn equals to nE , calculating un(z) by sequentially combining 







Furthermore, applying (4.16) and (4.17) to calculate each Un+1(z) based on Un(z)  and un(z) 











4.3. Optimization technique 
Equation (4.9) formulates a complicated combinatorial optimization problem. An 
exhaustive examination of all possible solutions is not realistic, considering reasonable 
time limitations. The genetic algorithm (GA) has proven to be an effective optimization 
tool for a large number of complicated problems in reliability engineering, and it is used 
for our optimization. To apply the GA to a specific problem the solution representation 
and the decoding procedures must be defined. 
 
4.3.1. Solution representation  
Each solution is represented by string S={s1,s2,…,sM}, where si corresponds to element i 
for each i=1,2,…,M.  
      Each number si determines both the number of the node onto which element i is 
allocated (h(i)) and the replacement interval of element i (Ti). To provide this property all 







Λ⋅<≤ Nsi0                                                 (4.18) 
where Λ  is the total number of considered replacement interval alternatives. 
 
4.3.2.     Solution decoding procedures  
       Step 1: Obtain the vectors (H, T) representing the position and replacement interval of 
each system element with the following procedures.  
      For a given S={s1,s2,…,sM}, calculate 
                                                               1]/[)( += Λisih                                              (4.19) 
                                                               ii sv Λmod1+=                                               (4.20) 
where vi is the number of replacement interval alternative for element i, [x] is the maximal 
integer not greater than x, and modxy=y-[y/x]x. The possible replacement interval 
alternatives are ordered in vector Q={q1,q2,…, Λq } so that qi<qi+1, where qi represents the 
replacement interval that corresponds to alternative i. After obtaining vi from decoding the 
solution string, the replacement interval for element i can be obtained as 
                                                               
ivi
qT =                                                 (4.21)       
      Step 2: For each given pair of vectors (H,T), first determine the availability of each 








      Step 3: From the vector H, determine the N mutually disjoint subsets En representing 
the elements allocated on the first N nodes of LMCCS.  
       Step 4: Obtain the entire system availability index A using the procedures presented in 
section 4.2. 
       Step 5: In order to let the genetic algorithm search for the solution with minimal 
maintenance cost, when A is not less than the required value A*, the solution quality 
(fitness) is evaluated as follows: 

















TH,             (4.22) 
where ω is a sufficiently large penalty.  
      For solutions that meet the requirements A≥A*, the fitness of the solution is equal to its 
total cost. 
 
4.3.3. Crossover and mutation procedures  
The cross operator for given parent strings P1, P2 and the offspring string O is defined as 
follows: the i-th element (1≤i≤M) of the string O is equal to the i-th element of either P1 
or P2 both with probability 0.5. 










4.4. Illustrative example 
Consider an LMCCS consisting of 9 nodes. M=8 elements are to be allocated onto the first 
8 nodes. The lifetime of the system Tc is 120 months. We assume that Λ=8 different 
replacement frequency alternatives are considered and the alternatives are 
h={29,24,19,14,9,4,2,1}. The replacement intervals corresponding to these alternatives are 
4 months, 4.8 months, 6 months, 8 months, 12 months, 24 months, 40 months and 60 
months respectively. The problem is to find the optimal positions and replacement 
intervals for all the 8 system elements so that the total system maintenance cost is 
minimized and the system availability requirement A* is satisfied. The characteristics of 
the elements are presented in Table 4.1. 
      According to (4.18) we have 
                                                                      640 <≤ is                                                        
For any given solution string, H and T can be decoded using (4.19), (4.20) and (4.21). 
Thereafter (4.22) can be used to obtain the fitness function F(H,T). The optimal element 









Table 4.1 The characteristics of the elements 
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
gi 3 4 3 2 1 1 4 3 
tpi(month) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 
cpi 100 110 100 80 50 45 105 95 
tmi(month) 0.036 0.042 0.040 0.035 0.025 0.025 0.045 0.034 
cmi 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 
λi(4) 0.8 0.72 0.64 0.6 0.72 0.7 0.6 0.5 
λi(4.8) 1.04 0.92 0.85 0.8 0.96 0.9 0.85 0.8 
λi(6) 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 
λi(8) 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.1 2.7 2.4 2.7 2.8 
λi(12) 5.5 5.2 5.4 4.2 5.3 4.8 5.4 5.8 
λi(24) 15 15 15 14 15 14 14 16 
λi(40) 33 32 31 32 33 32 31 33 
λi(60) 58 57 54 57 58 57 56 58 








4.4.1. The fitness function for a given solution string  
As an illustration, the fitness function for the solution string S={3,15,21,46,47,34,54,57} 
is obtained by the following procedures: 
Step 1: S is decoded into H=(1,2,3,6,6,5,7,8) and T= (8,60,24,40,60,6,40,4.8) using (4.19), 
(4.20) and (4.21). 
Step 2: The availability for each system element is calculated using (4.3) as A1=0.9870, 
A2=0.9601, A3=0.9749, A4=0.9719, A5=0.9758, A6=0.9937, A7=0.9651, and A8=0.9939. 
The total maintenance cost is calculated using (4.5) as Ctot=6631. 
Step 3: From the vector H, the N mutually disjoint subsets En representing the elements 
allocated on the first N nodes of LMCCS are obtained as E1={1}, E2={2}, E3={3}, E4= 
Φ , E5={6}, E6={4, 5}, E7={7}, E8={8}. The allocation of elements in LMCCS is shown 
in Figure 4.1. 
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Step 5: The fitness function is calculated as 
























     
4.4.2. The optimization problem 
The problem is to find the optimal element allocation and maintenance strategy (H,T) 
which minimizes F(H,T). In order to show the influence of element allocation, the 
optimization problem is solved for three different cases: 1) Fixed element allocation; 2) 
Even elements distribution among the nodes (no node contains more than one element); 3) 
Arbitrary allocation of the elements. 
 
Case 1: Fixed element allocation  
Table 4.2 contains the optimal solutions obtained for different values of A* with fixed 
H=(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8).  Each solution was obtained as the optimal one among five different 
runs of the GA with different randomly generated initial populations. The coefficients of 
variation among the values of F(H,T) obtained in the five runs are also presented in Table 
4.2. The low values of this coefficient evidence the good consistency of the GA.       
      With the increase of the availability requirement the elements need to be replaced 
more frequently, thus the total maintenance cost increases. The minimal availability 
A=0.9026 is achieved when T=(60,60,60,60,60,60,60,60) and the corresponding total 
maintenance cost is Ctot=2503. The maximum availability A=0.9794 is achieved when T= 








Table 4.2 Examples of solutions obtained for fixed elements distribution  
Constraints H T A F(T,x) variation
A*=0.90 (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8) (60,60,60,60,60,60,60,60) 0.9026 2503 0 
A*=0.95 (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8) (24,60,60,40,60,6,12,24) 0.9512 4340 0.46% 
A*=0.97 (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8) (8,60,60,60,60,4.8,6,60) 0.9709 6229 0.90% 
 
Case 2: Even elements distribution among the nodes 
Table 4.3 contains the optimal solutions obtained for different values of A* when no more 
than one element is allowed to be allocated onto the same node. This is achieved by 
adding a large penalty to the fitness function when the corresponding H has at least two 
equal elements. Each solution was obtained as the optimal one among five different runs 
of the GA with different randomly generated initial populations. The coefficients of 
variation among the values of F(H,T) obtained in the five runs are also presented in Table 
4.3 to illustrate the good consistency of the GA. 
      With the increase of the availability requirement the elements need to be replaced 
more frequently, thus the total maintenance cost increases. Comparing with Table 4.2, less 
maintenance cost is needed to reach the same level of availability requirement. It can be 
seen that for A*=0.90 and 0.95, only the least frequent replacements 
T=(60,60,60,60,60,60,60,60) are needed to meet the availability requirement if the 
elements are allocated appropriately. In these cases the system reliability improvement is 








Table 4.3 Examples of solutions obtained for even elements distribution   
Constraints H T A F(T,x) variation
A*=0.90 (2,8,4,6,7,1,3,5) (60,60,60,60,60,60,60,60) 0.9045 2503 0 
A*=0.95 (7,6,8,3,5,2,1,4) (60,60,60,60,60,60,60,60) 0.9547 2503 0 
A*=0.97 (1,6,4,5,3,7,8,2) (24,60,60,60,60,60,60,60) 0.9726 2721 0.48% 
A*=0.98 (6,2,3,1,5,8,7,4) (60,60,60,12,60,60,60,60) 0.9835 2999 0 
A*=0.99 (5,4,6,1,8,7,2,3) (60,60,60,6,60,60,60,60) 0.9901 3763 0.88% 
A*=0.992 (4,2,6,1,7,8,5,3) (60,40,60,4.8,60,60,60,60) 0.9921 4211 0.24% 
       
Case 3: Arbitrary allocation of the elements 
Table 4.4 contains the optimal solutions obtained for different values of A* when multiple 
elements are allowed to be allocated onto the same node. Each solution was obtained as 
the optimal one among five different runs of the GA with different randomly generated 
initial populations. The coefficients of variation among the values of F(H,T) obtained in 
the five runs are also presented in Table 4.4. The low values of this coefficient evidence 
the good consistency of the GA. 
      Comparing with Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, higher levels of availability requirements can 







requirement as high as A*=0.998, only the least frequent replacements 
T=(60,60,60,60,60,60,60,60) are needed if the elements are allocated appropriately. The 
extremely high availability requirement A*=0.9999 can be achieved with just a 
maintenance cost as high as 8431. 
 
Table 4.4 Examples of solutions obtained for arbitrary elements distribution   
Constraints H T A F(T,x) variation
A*=0.997 (8,4,1,8,8,4,1,5) (60,60,60,60,60,60,60,60) 0.9971 2503 0 
A*=0.998 (1,4,5,4,8,8,1,6) (60,60,60,60,60,60,60,60) 0.9980 2503 0 
A*=0.999 (1,1,6,7,5,4,5,4) (24,40,60,60,60,60,60,60) 0.9991 2777 0.32% 
A*=0.9992 (6,1,3,1,5,5,1,6) (24,60,60,60,60,60,40,40) 0.99925 2849 1.16% 
A*=0.9995 (4,5,6,7,4,5,1,1) (24,24,24,40,60,60,24,12) 0.99950 4087 1.44% 
A*=0.9999 (1,4,4,7,8,8,4,1) (8,6,40,60,40,12,12,4.8) 0.99990 8431 0.94% 
       










This chapter presents a framework to solve the joint element allocation and maintenance 
optimization problem for linear multi-state consecutively connected systems. An example 
of such system is a set of radio relay stations in which multi-state retransmitters with 
different characteristics are allocated. Since a linear consecutively connected system is not 
symmetrical, the availability of such a system is not only related to the respective 
availability of each element but also to the arrangement of the elements. It is shown that 
through optimally allocating the elements onto different nodes one can reduce the 
maintenance cost needed to meet a pre-specified availability requirement. 
       A universal generating function is used to evaluate the availability of the system and a 
genetic algorithm is adopted for the joint elements allocation and maintenance 
optimization. The application of the proposed framework is illustrated by numerical 
examples. The optimal elements allocation and maintenance strategy are found in the 
example for three different cases: 1) Fixed element allocation; 2) Even elements 
distribution among the nodes (no node contains more than one element); 3) Arbitrary 
allocation of the elements. For all the cases, the minimum maintenance cost increases with 
the increase of the availability requirement. It is revealed clearly in the results that the 
flexibility of element allocation enables the system to achieve much higher availability 











For a system under intentional attacks, the attacker can take advantage of its knowledge 
about the system to optimize its attacking strategy so as to incur maximum expected 
damage to the system (Bier et al., 2005; Patterson and Apostolakis, 2007; Xiao et al., 
2008). Thus it is important for the defender to take into consideration the attacker’s 
strategy when he decides how to allocate its resource among several defensive measures 
(Dighe et al., 2009; Powell, 2007a; Powell, 2007b).    
As the two simplest systems, the protections of series systems and parallel systems 
against intentional attacks have been discussed in many papers, such as Bier and 
Abhichandani (2002), Bier et al. (2005), and Hausken (2008). The protection is a technical 
or organizational measure which is aimed to reduce the vulnerability of protected system 
elements. The vulnerability of each element is its destruction probability when it is 
attacked. It can be determined by an attacker-defender contest success function. The 
contest between the defender and the attacker is usually modeled as a two-period game 







distribute its defending resource among different components to minimize the expected 
damage to the system assuming that the attacker will use the most harmful strategy to 
attack. When the attacker moves, it has full knowledge of the defender’s resource 
allocation and it can optimally allocate its attacking resource so that the expected damage 
to the system is maximized. In these papers the optimal resource allocation problem is 
formulated as a minmax problem: the defender chooses its free choice variables to 
minimize the system vulnerability corresponding to the most harmful attacker's action. 
Besides direct protections, deploying false targets (FTs) is another effective measure 
to defense systems under intentional attacks and it is an often employed strategy. The 
objective of a FT, sometimes referred to as a decoy, is to give the appearance that the 
element is something else than it actually is. A FT conceals or distracts something else, i.e. 
the genuine object, which the attacker actually searches for.  
      The aim of deploying FTs is to misinform the attacker so that the genuine element (GE) 
will be attacked with less probability or less attacking effort. Levitin and Hausken (2009a) 
has studied the efficiency of deploying FTs in defending a homogeneous parallel system. 
In Hausken and Levitin (2009), the defense strategy of deploying FTs in series systems is 
analyzed. Levitin and Hausken (2009b) studied the optimal resource allocation between 
constructing redundant genuine elements, protecting these elements and deploying false 
targets. All these papers assume that the FTs are perfect, that is, the attacker has no 
preference between attacking a genuine target and attacking a FT. In practice the false 
targets are after all different from the genuine target, and it is possible for the attacker to 







      In this chapter, we consider defense of simple series and parallel systems that includes 
both protecting the elements and deploying FTs to distract the attacker. These FTs are 
imperfect and the attacker can detect each of them with the same probability. From 
practical point of view, the detection probability of a false target can be estimated from 
past experiences or experiments. Once the attacker detects a certain number of FTs, it 
ignores them and chooses such number of remaining elements randomly to attack that 
maximizes the expected damage to the system. The defender decides how many FTs to 
deploy to minimize the expected damage caused by the attacks assuming that the attacker 
always uses the most harmful strategy to attack. The expected damage to a series system is 
proportional to the probability of system destruction. Depending on the type of the system, 
the expected damage to a parallel system can be defined in two ways: as proportional to 
the loss of demand probability (the probability that the demand is not met) or as the 
expected amount of the unsupplied demand. 
Section 5.1 presents the general model. Section 5.2 analyzes the defense of a simple 
series system with imperfect FTs. Section 5.3 analyzes the defense of a homogeneous 
parallel system with imperfect FTs. Section 5.4 concludes. 
 
 








1. The defender uses identical FTs with the same detection probability 
2. The attacker can detect each FT independently from other FTs 
3. The attacker knows the defender's effort distribution and number of GEs and FTs and 
decides how many elements to attack 
4. The attacker distributes its resources evenly among the attacked elements 
5. Each element is attacked separately. Single attack cannot destroy more than one 
element 
6. In a parallel system the genuine elements have identical performance  
7. The defender distributes its protection resources evenly among the genuine elements 
 
A system consisting of N identical genuine elements (GEs), which are connected either 
in series or in parallel. All system elements are exposed to intentional attacks. The 
defender and the attacker’s resources, r and R, are fixed. The unit costs for the attacker 
and the defender’s efforts are A and a respectively. The defender distributes its resource 
among deploying H FTs and protecting the GEs. Since an unprotected GE can be 
destroyed by an arbitrarily small but positive attack effort, we assume that the defender 
distributes its protection resource evenly among all the GEs.  The cost for deploying one 
FT is s. The FTs are imperfect i.e. the attacker can detect each FT with probability d. If the 












FTs and attacks Qk randomly chosen elements out of N+H-k remaining undetected 
elements, as shown in Figure 5.1.  
 
 
The vulnerability (destruction probability) of the attacked object is determined by the 
attacker-defender contest success function modeled with the common ratio form (Tullock, 
1980; Skaperdas, 1996; Hausken, 2005) as        




Tv                               (5.1)      
where T and t are the efforts allocated to the element by the attacker and the defender 
respectively, and m is a parameter that describes the intensity of the contest. Especially if 
an attacked element is without protection (T>0, t=0), the element will be destroyed with 
probability 1. When m=0, no matter what are the sizes of T and t the vulnerability of the 
element is 50%. When 0<m<1, there is a disproportional advantage of investing less than 











When m>1, there is a disproportional advantage of investing more than one’s opponent. 
When m=∞, v  is a step function where “winner-takes-all”. 
For each k the attacker solves the optimization problem and chooses the Qk which 








),()( . The defender solves the minmax problem: finds H that 
minimizes the maximal expected damage given that for any H the attacker chooses vector 
(Q0,…,QH) that maximizes the expected damage to the system D(Qk,H). Actually, this 
model applies also to the case when the attacker has no optimal strategy and chooses the 
value of Qk at random. The defender's most conservative strategy in this case is to 
anticipate the worst case scenario and assume that the attacker can guess the value of Qk, 
which makes the attack most effective and harmful. 
 
 
5.2. N genuine elements connected in series 
The system consists of N GEs connected in series. Destruction of any GE results in the 
destruction of the entire system. Since H (H≤r/s) FTs are deployed, the defense effort 
exerted on each genuine target is t=(r-Hs)/Na. In the case when k (0≤k≤H) FTs are 
detected by the attacker, it chooses Qk (1≤Qk≤N+H-k) targets out of N+H-k undetected 
elements to attack and the attack effort allocated onto each target is T=R/(QkA). The 


























−+=−+=+= ε         (5.2)                     
where aA /=ε . For any k and Qk the random number of attacked GEs can vary from 
max(0,Qk–H+k) (all FTs are attacked) to min(N,Qk) (all genuine targets are attacked). The 
probability ),( iQkϕ  that among Qk attacked elements i elements are the genuine ones can 
be obtained using the hyper-geometric distribution: 

























iQ ),(ϕ                                   (5.3) 
The probability that at least one out of i attacked GEs is destroyed is 1-(1-v)i. The 




































































                                         
(5.4) 
The attacker chooses the Qk which maximizes the expected damage to the system. 
Thus the most harmful Qk can be expressed by ),(maxarg 1
* HQDQ kkHNQk k −+≤≤= .  
      Figure 5.2 presents the most effective attack strategies Qk* (0≤k≤5) for N=5, H=5, 







he has more resources. With the growth of the contest intensity it becomes more important 
for the attacker to achieve the effort superiority over the defender. Therefore the attacker 
concentrates greater per-target efforts by attacking fewer targets and Qk tends to decrease 
with the increase of m.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Optimal number of attacked targets for series systems 
 
      The total expected damage to the entire system is 
  






















⎛==                  (5.5)   
The defender chooses the H which minimizes D(H), thus we have the optimal number 
of deployed FTs ⎣ ⎦ )(minarg /0















































Figure 5.3 H* and D(H*) as functions of d for series systems 
 
Figure 5.3 presents the optimal number of FTs H* and the corresponding D(H*) as 
functions of d for N=5, R=r=1 and 1=ε  and different combinations of s and m. It can be 
seen that H* decreases with the increases of s and d. Indeed, it is not cost-effective to build 
many FTs if they are too expensive or can be rather easily detected by the attacker. D(H*) 
increases with the increase of s and d.  
 









































It can be seen that H* and D(H*) are non-monotonic functions of m. Figure 5.4 
represents the optimal number of FTs H* and D(H*) as functions of m for N=5, r=1, 1=ε , 
s=0.05, d=0.4 and different values of R. When R=0.1 the defense effort is superior, the 
defender benefits from the increase of the contest intensity and D(H*) decreases with m. 
When R>0.1, D(H*)  as function of m demonstrates non-monotonic behavior. This can be 
explained by the fact that changes in optimal values of H* and Qk can make the defender's 
object protection effort either inferior or superior. In the former case D(H*) increases with 
m whereas in the latter case D(H*) decreases with m.  
 


































Figure 5.5 H* and D(H*) as functions of N for series systems 
 
Figure 5.5 presents the optimal number of FTs H* and the corresponding D(H*) as 







that D(H*) increases with the increase of N. Obviously, the vulnerability of a series system 
increases with the growth of the number of elements in the system. 
 










































Figure 5.6 Efficiency analysis of deploying false targets for series systems 
 
Figure 5.6 presents the false targets deployment efficiency curves for r=1, 1=ε and 
different values of N, m, and R.  For any pair of (s,d) above the curve the deployment of 
any false target is not beneficial for the defender (H*=0). The (s,d) curves obtained for 
different combinations of model parameters can be used for making decisions about  false 
targets deployment.  
It is interesting that the critical value of d (the maximal value when the deployment of 
at least one FT is beneficial for the defender for a given s) can depend on the attacker's 
resource R non-monotonically. Figure 5.7 presents the critical value of d as a function of R 

























Figure 5.7 The critical value of d as a function of R for series systems 
 
It can be seen that, when s=0.25, the deployment of the FTs is not efficient for small 
values of R, then with the growth of R, it becomes efficient and then from certain values of 
R it becomes again inefficient. Indeed, when R is much smaller than r the defender obtains 
overwhelming superiority in the attack-protection contests and does not need any FT. 
When R is much greater than r the attacker has enough resources to attack all targets 
(including the FTs) preserving its superiority in the attack-protection contest and the FTs 
are not effective. The FTs are most effective when the amounts of the attacker's and the 
defender's resources are close. In this case the optimal deployment of the FTs can 
considerably reduce the damage. A numerical comparison of the expected damage is 








Numerical Comparison  
Here we show a numerical example and compare the efficiency of deploying FTs. 
Consider the FTs characterized by s=0.4 and d=0.2 when N=m=2, r= 1=ε . Since 
24.0/1/ == ⎥⎦⎥⎢⎣⎢⎥⎦⎥⎢⎣⎢ sr , H can take only values of 0, 1 and 2.   
We  have 
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For R=0.5, as D(H=0)=0.5, D(H=1)=0.6804, D(H=2)=0.9736, deploying FTs is not 
efficient. For R=1, D(H=0)=0.9697, D(H=1)=0.9596, D(H=2)=0.9999. Hence the damage 
is minimized when one FT is deployed in this case. For R=2 we get D(H=0)=0.9991, 
D(H=1)=0.9997, D(H=2)=1. Hence deploying FTs is not efficient again.  
The nonlinear dependence on R makes the intuitive decision about deploying the FTs 
impossible and emphasizes the importance of using the suggested model in the decision 











5.3. N genuine elements connected in parallel 
We consider a system that is built from N identical parallel GEs with the same 
functionality having performance g each. The system demand is F (F≤Ng). The system 
fails to meet the demand when at least ⎣ ⎦ 1/ +− gFN  elements are destroyed. 
      Since H (H≤r/s) FTs are deployed, the defense effort exerted on each genuine target is 
t=(r-Hs)/Na. In case that k (0≤k≤H) FTs are detected by the attacker, he chooses Qk 
( ⎣ ⎦ 1/ +− gFN ≤Qk≤N+H-k) targets out of N+H-k targets to attack and the attack effort 
allocated onto each target is T=R/(QkA). The vulnerability of each GE is determined in 
(5.2). 
      For any specific k and Qk the random number of attacked GEs can vary from 
max(0,Qk–H+k). The probability ),( iQkϕ  that among Qk attacked elements i elements are 
the genuine ones is determined in (5.3). The probability ),( jiθ that among the i attacked 
GEs j elements are destroyed is  






⎛= −θ                                    (5.6) 
 
5.3.1. Damage proportional to the loss of demand probability 
If the system totally fails when the demand is not met, the expected damage is 







destroyed GEs j is greater than N-F/g i.e. j≥ ⎣ ⎦ 1/ +− gFN . In this case the expected 
damage to the system can be obtained as 














kk jiiQFHQD θϕ   .            (5.7) 
Thus the most harmful attacker's strategy is ),(maxarg 1
* HQDQ kkHNQk k −+≤≤= . The total 
expected damage to the entire system is obtained using (5.5). 
The defender chooses the H which minimizes D(H), thus we have the optimal number 
of deployed FTs ⎣ ⎦ )(minarg /0
* HDH srH ≤≤= . 
 


































Figure 5.8 H* and D(H*) as functions of d for parallel systems with damage proportional 








      Figure 5.8 presents the optimal number of FTs H* and the corresponding D(H*) as 
functions of d for N=8, R=r=1, 1=ε , F=4, g=1 and different combinations of s and m. It 
can be seen that, as in the case of series system, H* decreases with the increase of s and d.  
 







































Figure 5.9 H* and D(H*) as functions of m for parallel systems with damage proportional 
to the loss of demand probability  
 
As in the case of series system (Figure 5.4), H* and D(H*) are non-monotonic 
functions of m. Figure 5.9 presents the optimal number of FTs H* and D(H*) as functions 
of m for N=8, r=1, 1=ε , s=0.04, d=0.4, F=4, g=1 and different values of R. It can be 
explained in the same way as in the case of series system. When R=0.1 and 0.5 the defense 
effort is superior, the defender benefits from the increase of the contest intensity and D(H*) 
decreases with m. When R=1, D(H*) as function of m demonstrates non-monotonic 
behavior. This can be explained by the fact that changes in optimal values of H* and Qk 







case D(H*) increases with m whereas in the latter case D(H*) decreases with m. When 
R=1.3 and 1.5 the defense effort is inferior, the attacker benefits from the increase of the 
contest intensity and D(H*) increases with m.    
 






























Figure 5.10 H* and D(H*) as functions of N for parallel systems with damage proportional 
to the loss of demand probability  
 
Figure 5.10 presents the optimal number of FTs H* and the corresponding D(H*) as 
functions of N for R=r=1, 1=ε , s=0.05, d=0.4, F=4, g=1 and different values of m. It can 
be seen that D(H*) decreases with the increase of N. Indeed increase of N makes the 
system less vulnerable because its redundancy increases. In this case the defender spends 
more resources for protection of the increased number of GEs and deploys fewer FTs for 













































Figure 5.11 Efficiency analysis of deploying false targets for parallel systems with damage 
proportional to the loss of demand probability  
 
As in the case of series systems, we have plotted the false targets deployment 
efficiency curves for F=4, g=1, r=1, 1=ε and different values of N, m, and R, as shown in 
Figure 5.11. Similar to the case of series system (Figure 5.6), the critical d depends on R 
non-monotonically. 
 
5.3.2.  Damage proportional to the unsupplied demand 
When j GEs are destroyed the amount of unsupplied demand is equal to max(0,F-(N-j)g). 
The unsupplied demand becomes positive when j≥ ⎣ ⎦ 1/ +− gFN . The expected 
unsupplied demand can be obtained as 
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The attacker chooses ),(maxarg 1
* HQDQ kkHNQk k −+≤≤= . The total expected damage 
to the system is obtained using (5.5). The defender chooses the H which minimizes D(H): 
⎣ ⎦ )(minarg /0
* HDH srH ≤≤=  . 
 





































Figure 5.12 H* and D(H*) as functions of d for parallel systems with damage proportional 
to the unsupplied demand  
 
      Figure 5.12 presents the optimal number of FTs H* and the corresponding D(H*) as 
functions of d for N=8, R=r=1, 1=ε , F=4, g=1 and different combinations of s and m. It 
can be seen that the function H*(d) in Figure 5.12 behaves similarly to that in Figure 5.8. 
Actually since the loss of demand probability and the unsupplied demand are positively 
correlated, H* that minimizes the loss of demand probability (Figure 5.12) is equal or 
close to H* that minimizes the unsupplied demand (Figure 5.8). D(H*) in Figure 5.12 is 
much lower than that in Figure 5.8. Indeed, the damage proportional to the unsupplied 







because when the demand is not met, in the former case the system can still function with 
reduced performance supplying the part of the demand whereas in the latter case the 
system totally fails.  
 







































Figure 5.13  H* and D(H*) as functions of m for parallel systems with damage proportional 
to the unsupplied demand  
 
      Figure 5.13 presents H* and D(H*) as functions of m for N=8, r=1, 1=ε , s=0.04, 
d=0.4, F=4, g=1 and different values of R. Similar to Figure 5.9, when R=0.1 and 0.5 
D(H*) decreases with m. When R=1, D(H*) as function of m demonstrates non-monotonic 
behavior. When R=1.3 and 1.5, D(H*) increases with m. Since the system doesn’t totally 









































Figure 5.14 H* and D(H*) as functions of N for parallel systems with damage proportional 
to the unsupplied demand  
 
      Figure 5.14 presents the optimal number of FTs H* and the corresponding D(H*) as 
functions of N for R=r=1, 1=ε , s=0.05, d=0.4, F=4, g=1 and different values of m. 
Similar to Figure 5.10,  D(H*) decreases with N. As the system doesn’t totally fail when 
















































Figure 5.15 Efficiency analysis of deploying false targets for parallel systems with damage 
proportional to the unsupplied demand  
 
As in subsection 5.3.1, we have plotted the false targets deployment efficiency curves 
for F=4, g=1, r=1, 1=ε and different values of N, m, and R, as shown in Figure 5.15.  




This chapter considers defending series and parallel systems against intentional attacks. 
The defender allocates part of its resource into deploying FTs and uses its remaining 
resource to protect the genuine system elements. It is assumed that each FT has a nonzero 
probability to be detected by the attacker and the detections of different FTs are 







chooses such number of undetected elements to attack that maximizes the expected 
damage to the system. The defender decides how many FTs to deploy to minimize the 
expected damage to the system assuming that the attacker uses the most harmful attack 
strategy. The expected damage to the series system is proportional to the probability of 
system destruction. Depending on the type of system the expected damage to the parallel 
system is either proportional to the loss of demand probability or equal to the unsupplied 
demand. 
The chapter demonstrates the methodology of analysis of optimal defense strategy as 
the function of different parameters (number of GEs, contest intensity, total attacker's 
resource). It presents the decision curves that can be used for the making a decision about 
efficiency of deploying FTs depending on their cost and detection probability. 
For any type of considered systems, the optimal number of FTs decreases with the 
increase of the detection probability or the unit cost of each FT. The number of FTs also 
decreases with the growth of the number of GEs. For any type of systems the expected 
damage can be non-monotonic function of the contest intensity. 
With the increase of the number of GEs the expected damage to the series system 
increases, since the defender has to protect all N elements while the attacker can destroy 
the entire system by destroying any single GE. 
      With the increase of the number of GEs the expected damage to the parallel system 







The expected damage proportional to the unsupplied demand is always much lower 
than in the expected damage proportional to the loss of demand probability. 
The numerical analysis of the presented model shows the complicated interaction of 
free choice strategic variables and nonlinear dependence of the optimal number of FTs on 
different parameters. For example, the efficiency of FTs deployment can depend on the 
attacker's resource non-monotonically. Therefore, the intuitive decisions about the optimal 
strategy can be misleading and the use of the suggested model can be very helpful for 







CHAPTER 6 FURTHER WORK ON SYSTEM DEFENSE 
WITH FALSE TARGETS 
 
 
In chapter 5, it is assumed that the detection probability of a false target is constant. This 
assumption does not address to the case when the attacker can take intelligence actions to 
detect false targets. In this chapter, we assume that the attacker allocates part of its budget 
into intelligence actions in order to detect false targets. Analogously, the defender 
allocates part of its budget into disinformation actions in order to deploy the false targets 
and prevent them from being detected. The detection probability of a false target is 
determined by the intelligence and disinformation efforts allocated on the false target by 
the attacker and the defender. In Levitin and Hausken (2009c) it is assumed that if the 
attacker's intelligence actions succeed, the attacker can identify and attack the defended 
object and ignore all false targets. However in many cases (for example, when the attacker 
can detect only specific features of the FTs) the intelligence actions can result in 
identifying part of FTs. In this case the attacker has a set of unidentified targets when it 







This chapter considers defending a single genuine object including the strategy of 
deploying false targets that can be detected by the attacker individually and independently. 
We assume that both the attacker’s and the defender’s resources are fixed and both of 
them have full knowledge of each other’s efforts. The contest between the defender and 
the attacker is modeled as a two period game where the defender moves in the first period, 
and the attacker moves in the second period. The defender builds the system over time and 
the attacker takes it as given when it chooses its attack strategy. In this chapter we study 
the defender’s most conservative strategy which minimizes the probability of the object 
destruction assuming that the attacker always chooses the most harmful strategy no matter 
what the defender’s strategy is. It is pointed out in Shier (1991) that the most conservative 
strategy is “particularly appropriate in the design of robust military systems”.  
Section 6.1 presents the model. Section 6.2 assumes that the number of false targets is 
fixed and the attacker tries to detect all the false targets. In Section 6.3 we assume that the 
defender can choose how many false targets to deploy and the attacker tries to detect all 
the false targets. In Section 6.4 we assume that the defender can choose how many false 
targets to deploy and the attacker tries to detect only a subset of false targets.  
 
 








1. The defender uses identical false targets and allocates the disinformation efforts evenly 
among them. 
2. The attacker allocates the intelligence efforts evenly among the targets it tries to detect. 
3. The attacker allocates the attack effort evenly among all the attacked targets. 
4. The attacker can successfully identify some targets as false targets (by detecting some 
features that characterize the FTs), but cannot confidently identify any target as the 
genuine object (the fact that specific FT features are not detected can mean either that 
the detection failed or that the target is the genuine object). 
 
The defender has deployed one genuine object and H false targets (FTs). The total 
attacker's resource is R. The attacker can allocate part of its resource RX (0≤X≤1) into 
intelligence effort aimed at detecting FTs. The cost of the intelligence effort unit is B. The 
attacker tries to detect FTs among the H+1 targets. The intelligence effort allocated on 
each target is S=RX/[B(H+1)]. Once the attacker has detected a certain number k (0≤k≤H) 
of FTs, it will choose Qk targets among the H-k+1 undetected targets to attack such that Qk 
maximizes the probability of the genuine object destruction. The cost of the attack effort 
unit is A. The attack effort allocated on each attacked target is T=R(1-X)/(QkA). 
The defender's total resource is r. It distributes xr (0≤x≤1) into disinformation actions, 
which includes deploying H FTs and preventing the FTs from being detected by the 







The cost of the protection effort unit is a. The cost of the disinformation effort unit is b. 
The effort for protecting the defended object is t = r(1-x)/a, whereas the disinformation 
effort allocated on each FT is s=rx/(bH).  
We assume that two contests take place in the considered game: intelligence contest 
and impact (protection-attack) contest. We here apply the commonly used ratio form of 
the attacker-defender contest function (Hausken 2005, Tullock 1980, Skaperdas 1996). 
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where f is a parameter that specifies the intensity of the contest, that is how decisively the 
agents fight or compete in the contest. f=0 gives egalitarian distribution. f=1 gives 




Bh ⋅=  is the defender's 
intelligence superiority parameter that specifies how the intelligence resource ratio x/X is 
realized into intelligence effort ratio s/S.  
      h>1 decreases the probability of detection which gives advantage to the defender, 
whereas h<1 increases the probability of detection which gives advantage to the attacker.  
      The probability that k (0≤k≤H) FTs are detected by the attacker is given by 












      The probability of the attacker's success in the impact contest (object vulnerability) is  
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      In the case that k FTs are detected by the attacker (with probability pk), the attacker 
chooses Qk (1≤ Qk ≤ H-k+1) out of H-k+1 undetected targets to attack. Having the 
probability that the genuine object is attacked Qk /(H-k+1) and the probability of attack 










































Ag ⋅=  is the defender's impact superiority parameter that specifies how the 
impact resource ratio (1-x)/(1-X) is realized into impact effort ratio t/T  when Qk=1. 
      g>1 decreases the probability of target destruction in the case of attack which gives 
advantage to the defender, whereas g<1 increases the probability of target destruction in 
the case of attack which gives advantage to the attacker.  
      For each combination of H, x, X and k the attacker chooses the optimal Qk=Qk* which 
maximizes vk(Qk). For any combination of H, x, and X, the maximal object destruction 
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      For any defender's strategy (H,x) the attacker responds with X that maximizes V(H,x,X) 
obtained in (6.5). We use X* to denote the optimal X and V*(H,x) to denote V(H,x,X*). 
      The defender must choose the combination of (H,x), denoted as (H*, x*), which 
minimizes V*(H,x).    
 
 
6.2. Fixed number of deployed FTs  
In this section we assume that the number of deployed FTs H is fixed. From (6.4) we have 
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Qv and maximal vk(Qk)  is achieved when Qk=H-k+1.  In this case we 
have    



































, where ⎣ ⎦x  is the maximal integer not greater than x. 
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k                  (6.8) 
Observe, that when m>1 and F<H-k+1, Qk* does not depend on H. 
      Figure 6.1 presents the most harmful attack strategies Qk* (0≤k≤6) for H=6, g=1, x=0.8 
and different combinations of X and m. The attacker tends to attack more elements when it 
has reserved more resource for attacks R(1-X). With the growth of the contest intensity it 
becomes more important for the attacker to achieve the effort superiority over the defender. 
Therefore the attacker concentrates greater per-target efforts by attacking fewer targets 
and Qk* tends to decrease with m. When k=H the attacker detects all the FTs and attack 













































Figure 6.1 Optimal number of attacked targets for different X 
 
For m≤1, the expected object vulnerability is  
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For m>1, the expected probability of object destruction is  













































   
      The optimal value of X which maximizes V(x,X) can be expressed as 
X*=argmax0≤X≤1V(x,X) and the corresponding object destruction probability is 







and the corresponding object destruction probability V*(x) as functions of the defender’s 
disinformation resource proportion x for H=6, g=1, m=1.5, f=1 and different values of h. It 
can be seen that the behavior of X* as function of x is irregular, however, in general, it 
takes an inversed u-shape form. V*(x) is u-shaped function of x. When x is small, the 
increase of disinformation actions will make the FTs harder to be detected and thus reduce 
the object destruction probability. Further increase of x can leave the genuine object 
poorly protected, which increases the possibility of its destruction with low attacker's 
effort. The u-shaped form of V*(x) shows that the optimal balance between the protection 
effort and disinformation effort minimizes the object vulnerability. It can also be seen that 
V*(x) decreases with the increase of h. Actually from (6.1) we can see that the increase of 
h will reduce the detection probability of each FT and thus reduce the object destruction 
probability.   
 









































In order to understand the irregular behavior of X* with the increase of x, Figure 6.3 shows 
the object destruction probability V(x,X) as a function of the attacker’s intelligence 
resource proportion X for H=6, g=1, m=1.5, f=1, h=0.6 and different values of x. It can be 
seen that due to the complexity of V(x,X) the optimal value of X behaves non-
monotonically even when the value of x changes in a small range. When x=0.2, the 
optimal value of X is at point A. When the value of x increases to 0.25, the optimal value 
of X increases to point B. When the value of x increases to 0.3, the optimal value of X 
decreases to point C. The stepwise changes of  X*(x) are caused by discrete variations of 
the corresponding Qk* in the optimal attacker's strategy.  
 



















Figure 6.3 V(x,X) as a function of X for different x 
 
      The optimal value of x (solution of the two-period minmax game) is x*=argmin0≤x≤1 







defender’s optimal disinformation resource proportion x*, the attacker’s optimal 
intelligence resource proportion X* and the object destruction probability V* as functions 
of the defender’s disinformation superiority parameter h for H=6, g=1, m=1.5 and 
different values of f. It can be seen that x* first increases with the increase of h and then 
decreases with the increase of h. When h is small, the increase of h makes FTs harder to 
be detected thus justifies the allocation of more disinformation resource. When h has 
reached a certain level the FTs are already very hard to be detected, thus it is more cost-
effective to spend more resource on protecting the genuine object. V* decreases with the 
increase of h, since the increase of h has reduced the detection probability of each FT. 
When h is low the attacker’s intelligence effort is superior, thus V* increases with the 
increase of f. When h is high the defender’s disinformation effort is superior, thus V* 
decreases with the increase of f.   
      The oscillations of X* are similar to those observed in Levitin and Hausken (2009c). 
The vulnerability function V(X) for fixed x has two maxima: one at some positive value of 
X and one at X=0. These maxima frequently have similar values, which cause the attacker 
to be indifferent between zero investment into the intelligence effort and a specific 
positive investment. In practice the oscillating behavior of the attacker's intelligence effort 
fraction X* causes the attacker to concentrate all its resources on impact effort sacrificing 
the intelligence. Indeed, the exact values of the contest intensities are hard to estimate and 
predict in practice. Small alterations of these intensities may make nonzero intelligence 
effort beneficial or not beneficial to the attacker. Hence the attacker can never be sure that 







nonzero resource fraction into counter-intelligence in order to maintain the optimal 
solution when the attacker's intelligence investment deviates from the optimal value. 
 


















































Figure 6.4 x*, X* and V* as functions of h for different f   
 
      Figure 6.5 shows the defender’s disinformation resource proportion x*, the attacker’s 
intelligence resource proportion X*, the object destruction probability V* and V(x*,x*) as 
functions of the defender’s impact superiority parameter g for H=6, h=0.5, f=0.5 and 







impact superiority parameter g. When g is low the attacker’s attack effort is superior, thus 
V* increases with the increase of m. When g is high the defender’s protection effort is 
superior, thus V* decreases with the increase of m. The attacker's and defender's resource 
distribution parameters are very close or coincide, which is also consistent with the results 
of Levitin and Hausken (2009c).  
 









































































      Figure 6.6 shows the defender’s disinformation resource proportion x*, the attacker’s 
intelligence resource proportion X*, the object destruction probability V* and V(x*,x*) as 
functions of the number of false targets H for g=0.5, h=0.5, f=0.5 and different values of m. 
V* decreases with the increase of H. The increased number of FTs makes the attacker 
more difficult to locate the genuine object, which either reduces the probability for the 
genuine object to be attacked or the attack effort allocated into attacking the genuine 
object. When H is low the attacker’s attack effort on the genuine object is superior, thus V* 
increases with the increase of m. When H is high much of the attacker’s attack effort is 
distracted by the FTs, thus the attack effort on the genuine object becomes inferior. Hence 
V* decreases with the increase of m. The attacker's and defender's resource distribution 
parameters are very close or coincide, which is also consistent with the results of Levitin 

















































































Figure 6.6 x*, X* and V* as functions of H for different m 
 
 
6.3. Optimal number of FTs 
In this section we assume that the cost of each FT cannot be less than cmin and the defender 
can choose how many FTs to deploy. For each fixed H and x, the attacker chooses the 
most harmful X and (Q0,…QH) to maximize the overall destruction probability of the 
genuine object. The corresponding overall destruction probability of the genuine object is 







      The maximal possible number of FTs the defender can deploy must not exceed 
Hmax=r/cmin. For any chosen value of H, the defender's resource allocated into 
disinformation actions rx must not be less than Hcmin, from which follows that 
x≥xmin=Hcmin/r=H/Hmax. The defender chooses the optimal strategy (H*,x*) which 
minimizes V*(H,x):  
(H*,x*) = ).,(minarg *1;0 minmax xHVxxHH ≤≤≤≤  
In the following examples we use V* to denote V(H*,x*). Figure 6.7 shows the optimal 
number of false targets H*, the defender’s optimal disinformation resource proportion x*, 
the attacker’s optimal intelligence resource proportion X* and the object destruction 
probability V* as functions of the defender’s disinformation superiority parameter h for 
Hmax=50, g=1, m=1.5 and different values of f. Similar to Figure 6.4, V * decreases with the 
increase of h. When h is low the attacker’s intelligence effort is superior, thus V* increases 
with f. When h is high the defender’s disinformation effort is superior, thus V* decreases 
with f. When h reaches a certain level even the cheapest FTs cannot be detected by the 
attacker, thus V* doesn’t change much with variations of f and h.  
      We can get the asymptotic estimates of H*, x*, X* and V* for h→∞ as follows. When h 
approaches ∞, the detection probability w for any FT approaches zero for any f (see 
equation (6.1)) even when the defender distributes minimal resource into disinformation 
actions. In this case the defender always distributes rxmin= rH/Hmax=rH/50 into 
disinformation actions whereas the attacker does not invest any effort into intelligence 
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Solving the minmax problem 0maxmin v
oQH
 we get H*=25 and Q0*=3. The corresponding 
values of x* and V* are x*=H*/50=0.5 and V*= V*(H*,x*)=0.0407. 
      It can also be seen from Figure 6.7 that H* and x* vary with h and f in very similar 
manner, which means that the fraction of the defenders resource invested into each FT 
remains almost the same. The cheapest false targets are most favorable in the cases we 
consider. Actually for fixed intelligence resource x, the defender prefers to deploy more 








































































Figure 6.7 H*, x*, X* and V* as functions of h for different f 
 
      Figure 6.8 shows the optimal number of false targets H*, the attacker’s optimal 
intelligence resource proportion X*, and the object destruction probability V* as functions 
of the defender’s disinformation superiority parameter h for Hmax=50, g=1, m=1.5, f=2 and 
different fixed values of x. It can be seen that H* always equals to the maximum possible 


























































Figure 6.8 H*, X* and V* as functions of h for different x 
 
      Figure 6.9 shows the optimal number of false targets H*, the defender’s optimal 
disinformation resource proportion x*, the attacker’s intelligence resource proportion X* 
and the object destruction probability V* as functions of the defender’s impact superiority 
parameter g for Hmax=50, h=1, f=1 and different values of m. Similar to Figure 6.5, V* 
decreases with g. H* and x* vary with g and m in very similar manner. It can be explained 







      It can be seen that when g approaches infinity V* always approaches zero. Indeed, it 











, which means that the attacker attacks single target. 
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      In order to show how the impact contest intensity m influences the game solution, 
Figure 6.10 presents the optimal number of false targets H*, the defender’s optimal 
disinformation resource proportion x*, the attacker’s optimal intelligence resource 
proportion X* and the object destruction probability V* as functions of the impact contest 
intensity m for Hmax=50, h=1, f=1 and different values of g. It can be seen that H*, x* 
become more sensitive to variations of m when g increases. X*(m) oscillates, which means 
that two different values of X produce very close values of V.  
      The attack effort on the genuine object can be either superior or inferior depending on 
the optimal values of the free choice variables H, x and X. Thus V* as function of m 
displays non-monotonic behavior. It can be seen from Figure 6.10 that for Hmax=50, h=1, 










































































Figure 6.10 H*, x*, X*  and V* as functions of m for different g 
 
 
6.4. The attacker attempts to detect a subset of targets  
In this section we assume that the attacker can distribute its intelligence efforts onto a 
subset of targets. In the case that the attacker chooses J (0≤ J ≤H+1) targets to detect, the 
intelligence effort allocated on each target is S=RX/BJ. The probability of the attacker's 
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      Once the attacker has detected a certain number k (0≤k≤J) of FTs, it will choose Qk 
targets among the H-k+1 undetected targets to attack such that Qk maximizes the 
probability of genuine object destruction.  
      In the case when the genuine object is among the checked targets (with probability 
J/(H+1)), at most J-1 FTs can be detected. The probability that k (0≤k<J) FTs are detected 
by the attacker is given by  





⎛ −= 1)1(1~                                           (6.14)    
and the probability that all J FTs are detected is 0~ =Jp . 
      In the case that the genuine object is not among the checked targets (with probability 
1-J/(H+1)), the probability that k (0≤k≤J) FTs are detected by the attacker is given by  
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      (6.16)  
      In the case that k FTs are detected by the attacker (with probability pk), the attacker 
chooses Qk (1≤ Qk ≤ H-k+1) out of H-k+1 undetected targets to attack. The genuine object 
destruction probability is given in (6.4).                                
      For each combination of H, x, X, J and k the attacker chooses the optimal Qk=Qk* 
which maximizes vk(Qk). For any combination of H, x, X and J the maximal object 
destruction probability can be expressed as 
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      For any defender's strategy (H,x) the attacker responds with the X and J that maximize 
V(H,x,X,J). We use X* and J* to denote the optimal X and J and V*(H,x) to denote 
V(H,x,X*,J*). Figure 6.11 shows the attacker’s optimal intelligence proportion X*, the 
optimal number of checked targets J* and the object destruction probability V*(H,x) as 
functions of the defender’s disinformation resource proportion x for H=6, g=1, m=3, f=3 
and different values of h. Similar to Figure 6.2 the behavior of X* as function of x is non-




























































Figure 6.11 X*, J* and V*(H, x) as functions of x for different h 
      V*(H, x) is u-shaped function of x and decreases with the increase of h. J* decreases 
with the increase of h, since the attacker needs to concentrate its intelligence effort on 
fewer targets in order to gain superiority in intelligence contest when h increases. When J* 
doesn’t change in some range of h, X* increases to cope with the increased x*. When the 
attacker prefers to concentrate its intelligence effort, J* decreases and X* decreases 
accordingly.  
      Similar to Section 6.3, the defender chooses the optimal strategy (H*,x*) which 
minimizes V(H,x): (H*,x*) = ).,(minarg *1;0 minmax xHVxxHH ≤≤≤≤  We also use V
* to 







optimal disinformation resource proportion x*, the attacker’s optimal intelligence resource 
proportion X*, the optimal number of checked targets J* and the object destruction 
probability V* as functions of the defender’s disinformation superiority parameter h for 
Hmax=25, g=1, m=3 and different values of f. Similar to Figure 6.7, V* decreases with the 
increase of h. H* and x* vary with h and f in very similar manner. H*, x* and V* converge 
when h approaches infinity. X* and J* converge to 0 when h approaches infinity, since it is 
not possible for the attacker to detect any false target irrespectively how much resource is 
allocated into intelligence actions. The oscillations of X* and J* have the same nature as in 
Figure 6.4.  
      Figure 6.13 shows the optimal number of false targets H*, the defender;s optimal 
disinformation resource proportion x*, the attacker’s optimal intelligence resource 
proportion X*, the optimal number of checked targets J* and the object destruction 
probability V* as functions of the defender’s impact superiority parameter g for Hmax=25, 
h=1, f=3 and different values of m. H* and x* become more sensitive to variations of g as 
m increases. Similar to Figure 6.9 V* decreases with g and approaches 0 when g 
approaches infinity. H* and x* vary with g and m in very similar manner. The increase of g 



















































































Figure 6.12 H*, x*, X*, J* and V* as functions of h for different f 
 



























































































Figure 6.13 H*, x*, X*, J* and V* as functions of g for different m 











This chapter considers the deployment of false targets as a measure to defense systems 
against intentional attacks. The defender deploys a genuine object and multiple false 
targets to divert the attacker. The defender allocates its resource between defending the 
genuine object and investing into disinformation actions to ensure that the attacker cannot 
distinguish the false targets from the genuine object. The attacker allocates its resource 
between attacking and investing into intelligence actions trying to detect the false targets. 
The detection probability of a FT is determined by the attacker’s intelligence effort and 
the defender’s disinformation effort allocated on it. Each FT can be detected individually 
and independently. If the attacker detects a certain number of FTs, it attacks a subset of 
randomly chosen undetected targets (the attacker chooses such number of targets in the 
subset that maximizes the object destruction probability). The vulnerability of the genuine 
object is determined by the attack effort and the protection effort allocated in it. The 
defender seeks to minimize the object destruction probability. The attacker seeks to 
maximize the object destruction probability. We consider a minmax two period game in 
which the defender chooses its strategy in the first period assuming that the attacker 
responds with the most harmful strategy in the second period. 
      The complex interaction of the free choice variables and parameters in the game 
makes its intuitive analysis impossible. The chapter suggests the probabilistic model of the 







The cases when the number of FTs is exogenously given and when this number is 
optimized by the defender are considered as well as the cases when the attacker tries to 
detect all FTs or optimally chooses the number of targets he tries to detect. 
It is shown that in many cases the resource distribution parameters of both players (x 
and X) behave very similarly, however in some cases the attacker's resource distribution 
parameter demonstrates oscillating behavior. These effects are similar to those observed in 
Levitin and Hausken (2009c).  
It is demonstrated that for some parameters of the game any intelligence activity is not 
effective for the attacker. The methodology of numerical analysis that determines the 







CHAPTER 7 OPTIMAL SYSTEM REPLACEMENT AND 
PROTECTION STRATEGY  
 
 
For systems containing elements with increasing failure rates, preventive replacement of 
the elements is an efficient measure to increase the system reliability (Levitin and 
Lisnianski, 1999; Yeh et al., 2010; Chien et al., 2010). Replacing elements that have a 
high risk of failure, while reducing the chance of failure, can incur significant expenses, 
especially in systems with high replacement rates. Minimal repair, the less expensive 
option, enables the system element to resume its work after failure, but does not affect its 
hazard rate (Beichelt and Fischer, 1980; Beichelt and Franken, 1983; Chang et al., 2010). 
Since the component replacement reduces its failure rate, the more frequently the 
component is replaced the higher the availability of the component is. Besides internal 
failures, a component may also fail due to external impacts, say, natural disasters (Zhuang 
and Bier, 2007). In order to increase the survivability of a component under external 
impacts, defensive investments can be made to protect the component. It is reasonable to 
assume that the external impact frequency is constant over time and that the probability of 
the component destruction by the external impact decreases with the increase of the 







system maintenance and its protection. The optimal maintenance and protection strategy 
needs to take both of these factors into account in order to reach a solution that provides 
the desired system reliability at minimum cost.  
      This chapter considers a series-parallel system consisting of components with different 
characteristics (nominal performances, hazard functions, protection costs etc.). The 
objective is to minimize the total cost of the damage associated with unsupplied demand 
and the costs of the system maintenance and protection. A universal generating function 
(UGF) technique is used to evaluate the system availability for any maintenance and 
protection policy. A genetic algorithm is used for the optimization. Section 7.1 formulates 
the problem. Section 7.2 describes the method of calculating the system availability. 
Section 7.3 provides a description of the genetic algorithm. Numerical examples are 
shown in Section 7.4.  
      
 
7.1. Problem formulation and description of system model 
7.1.1. General model and assumptions 
Assumptions: 
1. All the system components are independent. 







3. The time spent on replacement is negligible.  
4. The time spent on a minimal repair is much less than the time between failures.   
 
      A system that consists of M subsystems connected in series is considered. Each 
subsystem m contains Em elements connected in parallel. The lifetime for the system is 
denoted as Tc. For each component i, its nominal performance is denoted as Gi and the 
expected number of internal failures during time interval (0,t] is denoted as )(tiλ , which 
is an increasing function of t. Each component is subjected to internal failures and external 
impacts. The failures caused by internal failures and external impacts are fixed by minimal 
repairs. It is assumed that the following two kinds of maintenance actions can be taken 
(Sheu and Chang, 2009): 
     1) Preventive replacement. The i-th component is replaced when it reaches an age Ti. 
The cost Ci of each replacement is constant. As the preventive replacement is planned 
action the average time for the replacement is assumed to be negligible. 
     2) Minimal repair. This action is used after internal failures or destructive external 
impacts and doesn’t affect the hazard function of the component. The average cost for a 
minimal repair of component i is σi in the case of internal failure and θi in the case of 
external impact. The average time for a minimal repair of component i is ti in the case of 








7.1.2. The availability of each system element 
The average number of internal failures during the period between replacements λi(Ti) can 
be obtained by using the replacement interval Ti for each element. Therefore, the total 
expected number of internal failures of the component i during the system life cycle is  














n  is the number of preventive replacements ni during the system life cycle.  
We use xi to denote the protection effort allocated on component i and ai to denote the 
unit protection effort cost for component i. It is assumed that the external impact 
frequency q is a constant and the expected impact intensity is d. The component 
vulnerability (conditional probability of a component failure caused by an external impact) 
is evaluated using the contest function model (Hausken 2005, Tullock 1980, Skaperdas 
1996) as 
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where m is the contest intensity parameter. The expected number of the failures caused by 
the external impacts is therefore 














Hausken and Levitin (2008) discussed the meaning of the contest intensity parameter m. A 
benchmark intermediate value is m=1, which means that the investments into protection 
have proportional impact on the vulnerability reduction. 0<m<1 corresponds to the low 
effective types of protections with component vulnerability less sensitive to variation of 
the protection effort. m>1 corresponds to the highly effective types of protections with 
component vulnerability very sensitive to variation of the protection effort.   
From (7.1) and (7.3) we have the total expected repair time of component i as  
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Furthermore the availability of each element can be obtained as 
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7.1.3. The system capacity distribution 
The system capacity distribution must be obtained to estimate the entire system 
availability and the expected unsupplied demand. We use G={Gv} to denote the vector of 
all the possible total system capacities, which corresponds to its V different possible states; 
and P={pv} to denote the vector of probabilities, which corresponds to these states.  
      The entire system capacity distribution can be defined by using the algorithm 







(7.5). If we denote the system demand as W, the unsupplied demand probability should be 
calculated as 







vud GWpP                                     (7.6) 
The reliability of the entire system requires an availability index A=1-Pud that is not less 
than some preliminary specified level A*.  
      The total unsupplied demand cost can be estimated with the following expression 







vud GWGWpC α                            (7.7) 
where α is the cost of the unsupplied demand unit. 
 
7.1.4. The formulation of the optimization problem  
The optimization problem is to find the replacement intervals and protection efforts for 
system elements T=(T1,T2,…,TN) and x={x1,x2,…,xN} that minimize the sum of costs of 
the maintenance, protection, and unsupplied demand.  
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the expected minimal repair cost of component i .  
 
 
7.2.  System availability estimation method 
The entire system capacity distribution must be obtained in order to evaluate the 
availability index A and the total unsupplied demand cost Cud. The UGF was introduced in 
Ushakov (1986) and has proven to be extremely effective in evaluating reliability of 
complex multi-state systems (Liu and Huang, 2010; Yeh and He, 2010). The UGF of a 
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where the discrete random variable G has J possible values and pj is the probability that G 
is equal to gj. In our case, the polynomial u(z) can define capacity distributions, meaning it 
represents all possible states of the system (or element) by relating the probabilities of 







      Since each component i has a nominal performance gi and its availability is Ai, the u-
function of component i has only two terms and can be defined as  
 ,)1()( 0 igiii zAzAzu +−=  (7.10) 
The cumulative performance of parallel elements is equal to the sum of individual 
performances of these elements. Thus, the u-function of elements connected in parallel 
can be obtained by using the 
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The 
+
⊗  operator is a product of polynomials representing the individual u-functions. Each 
term of the resulting polynomial is obtained by multiplying the probabilities that 
correspond to different states of elements and by reaching a summation of the elements’ 
capacities that correspond to these states. 
      If a system contains subsystem connected in series, the subsystem with the minimal 
capacity bottlenecks the system. Therefore, this subsystem defines the total system 
capacity. The 
min







containing M subsystems connected in series. This operator for a pair of subsystems 
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The simple operator should be used to evaluate the probability that the random variable G 
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7.3. Optimization technique 
Equation (7.8) formulates a complicated combinatorial optimization problem. An 
exhaustive examination of all possible solutions is not realistic, considering reasonable 







tool for a large number of complicated problems in reliability engineering (Coit and 
Smith, 1996, Levitin et al., 1998; Lisnianski and Levitin, 2003). To apply the GA to a 
specific problem the solution representation and the decoding procedures must be defined. 
 
A. Solution Representation and decoding procedures 
Each solution is represented by string S={s1,s2,…,sN}, where si corresponds to component 
i for each i=1,2,…,N.  
      Each number si determines both the replacement interval of component i (Ti) and the 
protection effort allocated on component i (xi). To provide this property all the numbers si 
are generated in the range 
          Λ⋅+<≤ )1(0 Msi           (7.16) 
where M  is the maximum protection effort allowed to be allocated on a component and Λ  
is the total number of considered replacement frequency alternatives. 
      The solutions are decoded in the following manner: 
 ]/[ Λii sx =                                              (7.17) 







where vi is the number of replacement frequency alternative for component i, [x] is the 
maximal integer not greater than x, and modxy=y-[y/x]x. For given vi and xi the 
corresponding si is composed as follows: 
            1−+Λ⋅= iii vxs                                             (7.19) 
Note that all Λ<is  corresponds to the solutions where the component i is not protected.  
      The possible replacement frequency alternatives are ordered in vector 
h={h1,h2,…, Λh } so that hi< hi+1, where hi represents the number of replacements during 
the operation period that corresponds to alternative i. After obtaining vi from decoding the 
solution string, the number of replacement for component i can be obtained as  
                                        
ivi
hn =                                                     (7.20) 
Furthermore replacement interval for component i can be obtained as 










T                                                 (7.21) 
      For each given pair of vectors (T,x) the decoding procedure first calculates the 
availability of each element using (7.5), after which the entire system capacity distribution 
can be obtained by using (7.10), (7.11) and (7.12). The availability index A and the total 







      In order to let the genetic algorithm search for the solution with minimal total cost, 
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where ω is a sufficiently large penalty.  
      For solutions that meet the requirements A≥A*, the fitness of the solution is equal to its 
total cost. 
 
B. Crossover and mutation procedures  
The cross operator for given parent strings P1, P2 and the offspring string O is defined as 
follows: the i-th element (1≤i≤N) of the string O is equal to the i-th element of either P1 or 
P2 both with probability 0.5. 












7.4. Illustrative examples 
The system considered in this example consists of two subsystems. The first subsystem 
contains 5 components while the second subsystem contains 3 components. The lifetime 
of the system Tc is 120 months. The system demand W is 45. Figure 7.1 is shown for 
graphical illustration. 
 
      Figure 7.1 Graphical illustration of the considered system 
       
      We assume that totally Λ=6 different replacement frequency alternatives are 
considered and the alternatives are h={4, 9, 14, 19, 24, 29}. The corresponding 
alternatives for replacement interval are 24 months, 12 months, 8 months, 6 months, 4.8 

















Table 7.1 The characteristics of the components 
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Gi 10 10 12 12 14 15 15 20 
ai 7 8 8 9 10 10 11 12 
Ci 100 100 110 110 120 140 140 150 
ti(month) 0.030 0.033 0.036 0.042 0.045 0.045 0.048 0.048 
σi 8 8 8 7 8 6 8 7 
τi(month) 0.036 0.042 0.045 0.048 0.051 0.051 0.054 0.054 
θi 9 9 9 8 9 7 9 8 
λi(4) 0.8 0.72 0.64 0.6 0.72 0.7 0.6 0.5 
λi(4.8) 1.04 0.92 0.85 0.8 0.96 0.9 0.85 0.8 
λi(6) 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 
λi(8) 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.1 2.7 2.4 2.7 2.8 
λi(12) 5.5 5.2 5.4 4.2 5.3 4.8 5.4 5.8 








      For our example we assume that q=0.5, d=30, α=3000, and the maximum protection 
effort allowed to be allocated on a component is M=50. According to (7.16) we have 
 306)1(0 =Λ⋅+<≤ Msi   
For a given solution string, T and x can be decoded using (7.17), (7.18), (7.20) and (7.21). 
Thereafter (7.22) can be used to obtain the fitness function F(T,x). For example, the 
solution string S=[195 280 49 218 176 132 270 120] is decoded into T= (6 4.8 12 8 8 24 
24 24) and x = (32 46 8 36 29 22 45 20). For m=1 and A*=0.90, the fitness function for 
this solution takes the value F(T,x)=18190. 
      The problem is to find the optimal replacement and protection strategy (T,x) which 
minimizes F(T,x) subject to the availability requirement A>A*. 
      Table 7.2 contains the optimal solutions obtained for m=1 and different values of A*. 
Each solution was obtained as the optimal one among five different runs of the GA with 
different randomly generated initial populations. The coefficients of variation among the 
values of F(T,x) obtained in the five runs are also presented in Table 7.2. The low values 
of this coefficient evidence the good consistency of the GA. With the increase of the 
reliability requirement more resources need to be put into protection actions and the 
components need to be replaced more frequently, thus the total cost increases.  It can also 
be seen that Cud decreases with the increase of A*. Indeed, when the obtained system 









Table 7.2 Examples of solutions obtained for m=1   
Constraints T x A Cud F(T,x) variation
None (24 24 24 24 
24 24 24 24) 
(19 19 19 13  
19 13 13 10)
0.8946 1008.9 13143 0.02% 
A*=0.90 (24 24 24 24 
24 24 24 24) 
(21 21 21 14  
26 14 14 21)
0.9008 955.8333 13187 0.65% 
A*=0.95 (24 24 24 24 
6 24 24 4.8) 
(32 32 32 32 
42 32 32 50)
0.9505 549.9153 17482 1.66% 
       
      The maximum availability A=0.9645 can be achieved when maximal possible 
protection and replacement frequency are applied. In this case all the components are 
replaced every 4 months and the protection effort on each component is 50. The 
corresponding total cost is 34784. 
Table 7.3 contains the optimal solutions obtained for m=0.25 and different values of 
A*. Similar as in the case m=1, the total cost increases whereas unsupplied demand cost 
decreases with the increase of A*. For low intensive contest with m=0.25 the total incurred 
cost becomes lower than in the case of m=1 for small A* and greater than in the case of 
m=1 for high A*. Indeed, when A* is low the protection effort of an element is generally 
smaller than the external impact intensity. In this case for smaller m the sensitivity of the 







can afford to spend less into the protection. On the contrary, when A* is high, the 
protection effort of an element is generally bigger than the external impact intensity. But 
for smaller m it becomes more difficult to achieve vulnerability reduction by increasing 
the protection effort and the defender must spend more into the protection.  
 
Table 7.3 Examples of solutions obtained for m=0.25 
Constraints T x A Cud F(T,x) variation
None (24 24 24 24 
24 24 24 24) 
(6 4 4 4 4 4 
4 4) 
0.8981 957.7501 12112 0.44% 
A*=0.90 (24 24 24 24 
24 24 24 24) 
(6 6 6 6 8 6 
6 6) 
0.9000 931.1970 12147 0.23% 
A*=0.95 (24 12 24 12 
4 12 24 4.8) 
(12 17 12 17  
32 17 12 32)
0.9501 486.5937 18842 1.04% 
       
      The maximum availability A=0.9591 can be achieved when maximal possible 
protection and replacement frequency are applied. The corresponding total cost is 35210, 
which is greater than the case m=1. This is because when m=0.25, the protection is not as 
effective as in the case m=1.  
      Table 7.4 contains the optimal solutions obtained for m=4 and different values of A*.      
Similar as in the cases m=1 and m=0.25, the total cost increases while the unsupplied 







are very similar. Actually the near optimal solution obtained without availability 
constraint has an availability bigger than 0.90. Thus it is also a near optimal solution for 
the case A*=0.90. As can be seen the protection effort allocated on each element is always 
very big. This is because the domination of protection effort over external impact is very 
important when m=4.       
  
Table 7.4 Examples of solutions obtained for m=4 
Constraints T x A Cud F(T,x) variation
None (24 24 24 24 
24 24 24 24) 
(45 43 45 42  
43 41 41 41)
0.9238 569.7401 12865 0.08% 
A*=0.90 (24 24 24 24 
24 24 24 24) 
(44 44 44 41  
44 41 41 36)
0.9215 581.4035 12866 0.07% 
A*=0.95 (24 24 24 24  
8 24 24 8) 
(44 44 44 42  
50 42 42 49)
0.9556 397.0332 14931 0.25% 
       
      The maximum availability A=0.9792 can be achieved when maximal possible 
protection and replacement frequency are applied. The corresponding total cost is 33620, 
which is less than the case m=1. This is because the protection is more effective than in 































Figure 7.2 Optimal F(T,x) as functions of A* for different values of m 
 
Figure 7.2 shows the optimal F(T,x) as functions of A* for different values of m. As 
can be seen the optimal F(T,x) curve for m=1 is above the curve for m=0.25 when A* is 
small and below the curve for m=0.25 when A* is big enough. The optimal F(T,x) curve 
for m=4 is always below that for m=1, as the dominant protection effort can considerably 
reduce the failures caused by external impacts when m=4. 
 
 
7.5.  Conclusions 
In this chapter the optimal resource allocation between replacement and protection of 
components in a series-parallel system is studied. It is assumed that the failure rate of each 







minimal repairs. Since the component replacement reduces its failure rate, the more 
frequently a component is replaced the higher the availability of the component will be. 
On the other hand, the components may fail due to external impacts. It is assumed that the 
external impact frequency is constant. The destruction probability of a component in the 
case of an external impact is determined by the external impact intensity, the protection 
effort on the component and the contest intensity. The bigger the protection effort 
allocated on a component is, the lower its destruction probability will be. Thus a tradeoff 
exists between investments into system maintenance and its protection. In this chapter a 
framework is proposed to solve the optimal maintenance and protection strategy that 
provides the desired system reliability at minimum cost, which includes the total cost of 
the damage associated with unsupplied demand and the costs of the system maintenance 
and protection. Universal generating function technique is used to obtain the system 
availability and the total cost of the damage associated with unsupplied demand. Solutions 
are encoded into strings and a genetic algorithm is employed to search for the string with 
the best fitness function. Finally the optimal solution is obtained by decoding the optimal 
string.  
      Numerical examples are shown in this chapter. With the increase of the reliability 
requirement more resources need to be put into protection actions and the components 
need to be replaced more frequently, thus the total cost increases. Meanwhile with the 
increase of the obtained system availability, the unsupplied demand decreases. The 
maximum availability can be achieved when maximal possible protection and replacement 







      It is shown that whether the total cost increases or decreases with the increase of 
contest intensity depends on the element protection efforts. When the protection effort on 
each element is generally superior to the external impact intensity, the total cost decreases 
with the increase of the contest intensity. Otherwise the total cost increases with the 











In this thesis, the reliability of some networked systems is investigated. These systems 
include series-parallel systems subject to imperfect fault coverage, linear multi-state 
consecutively connected systems, series/parallel systems against external intentional 
attacks and series-parallel systems subjected to both internal failures and external attacks.  
      Chapter 3 studies the reliability of series-parallel systems with the consideration of 
imperfect fault coverage. It is assumed that the elements in the same subsystem can be 
divided into different work sharing groups to perform the same task. Due to imperfect 
fault coverage, a whole work sharing group can fail if one element fails and the failure is 
not covered. Different fault coverage models are discussed and the problem of finding the 
optimal balance between redundancy and task sharing is extended to the cases of multi-
fault coverage and performance dependent coverage. Illustrative examples are presented to 
show that the greatest system reliability (defined as a probability of meeting a certain 







      Chapter 4 studies a linear multi-state consecutively connected system (LMCCS) 
consisting of elements with increasing failure rates. A framework is proposed to solve the 
joint element allocation and maintenance optimization problem for LMCCS which 
minimizes the total system maintenance cost subject to pre-specified system availability 
requirements. The optimal elements allocation and maintenance strategy are found in the 
example for three different cases: 1) Fixed element allocation; 2) Even elements 
distribution among the nodes (no node contains more than one element); 3) Arbitrary 
allocation of the elements. For all the cases, the minimum maintenance cost increases with 
the increase of the availability requirement. It is revealed clearly in the results that the 
flexibility of element allocation enables the system to achieve much higher availability 
with less maintenance cost.  
      Chapter 5 and 6 study the defense of systems against external attacks. Chapter 5 
considers simple series and parallel systems against external intentional attacks. Different 
from existing papers which only consider perfect false targets, it is assumed that each false 
target (FT) has a nonzero probability to be detected by the attacker and the detections of 
different FTs are independent. The methodology of analysis of optimal defense strategy as 
function of different parameters (number of GEs, contest intensity, total attacker's resource) 
is demonstrated. The decision curves are also presented which can be used for the making 
a decision about efficiency of deploying FTs depending on their cost and detection 
probability. Chapter 6 considers defending a single genuine object with imperfect false 
targets. Different from Chapter 5, the detection probability of a false target is assumed to 
be a function of the attacker’s intelligence effort and the defender’s disinformation effort. 







optimized by the defender are considered as well as the cases when the attacker tries to 
detect all FTs or optimally chooses the number of targets he tries to detect.  
      Chapter 7 studies the optimal resource allocation between replacement and protection 
of components in a series-parallel system. It is assumed that the failure rate of each 
component is increasing over time and the failures between replacements are fixed by 
minimal repairs. On the other hand, the components may fail due to external impacts. It is 
assumed that the external impact frequency is constant. A framework is proposed to solve 
the optimal maintenance and protection strategy that provides the desired system 
reliability at minimum cost, which includes the total cost of the damage associated with 
unsupplied demand and the costs of the system maintenance and protection. Numerical 
examples are shown to illustrate the application. With the increase of the reliability 
requirement more resources need to be put into protection actions and the components 
need to be replaced more frequently, thus the total cost increases. Meanwhile with the 
increase of the obtained system availability, the unsupplied demand decreases.  
 
 
8.2. Future works 
This section discusses the limitations of the works contained in this thesis and suggests 







      In chapter 3, it is assumed that the same task can be shared by different components in 
the optimal way. An implicit assumption is that the task can be divided arbitrarily so that a 
component with greater capacity takes greater amount of task load. In reality, there may 
be situations where a task can only be divided into discrete number of subtasks. Although 
the insight of the current research still applies, a framework needs to be proposed to solve 
the optimal allocation of subtasks into different components. It would be an interesting 
and challenging issue to incorporate different kinds of fault coverage models with discrete 
division of tasks. Moreover, in chapter 3 universal generating function is used to calculate 
the performance distribution of the entire system, it would be interesting to try other 
methodologies, such as fault tree analysis and ordered binary decision diagram. 
      In chapter 4, it is assumed that the number of elements that are available is fixed and 
the allocation and maintenance of these elements are studied. There are situations where 
different versions of elements are available, say, in the market. In this case, the problem is 
to decide the number of each version of elements to be allocated into each position and the 
maintenance actions to be implemented on these elements. The total cost will contain not 
only the maintenance cost, but also the cost of elements themselves. Another thing that 
can be done is to use iterative methods instead of universal generating functions to 
calculate the reliability of linear multi-state consecutively connected systems. The 
computational complexity of different methods can be compared.  
There are a lot of things that can be done on defending system against intentional 
attacks. Chapter 5 studies the optimal defense of systems with imperfect false targets. It is 







the case where there are multiple types of false targets with different unit costs and 
detection probabilities. A framework needs to be proposed to solve the optimal 
combination of different types of false targets. Another research that can be done is to 
study the uncertainty that is caused by the contest intensity parameter. The model in 
chapter 5 uses the contest intensity parameter m that cannot be exactly evaluated in 
practice. Therefore the study of the influence of this parameter on the optimal and minmax 
strategies has a qualitative nature. Two ways of handling the uncertainty of the contest 
intensity can be outlined: first, m can be defined as a fuzzy variable and fuzzy logic model 
can be studied; second, the range of possible variation of m can be determined and the 
most conservative "worst case" defense strategy can be obtained under the assumption that 
m takes the values that are most favorable for the attacker (in this case m can be 
considered as an additional strategic variable that the attacker can choose within the 
specified range). The model consider in chapter 5 can also be extended to other systems, 
say, consecutively connected systems. In consecutively connected systems, some elements 
are in more important positions than others. Therefore the defender may prefer to allocate 
more protection efforts on some elements than others and the attacker also prefers to 
attack the most fragile parts of the system in order to maximize the system destruction 
probability. It would be very interesting to model the counter-contest between the 
defender and the attacker. In chapter 5 and 6, the contest between the defender and the 
attacker is modeled as a two-period game where the defender constructs the system at first 
period and the attacker attacks the system in second period. Further study can be done to 








Chapter 7 studies the optimal system maintenance and protection strategy when the 
system is subjected to internal failures and external attacks. The external attacks 
considered are limited to unintentional attacks, say, natural disasters. It must be interesting 
to study the optimal resource allocation strategy when the system is subjected to internal 
failures and both unintentional and intentional attacks. Say, an attacker who does not have 
intention to attack may choose to attack when a system is weakened by internal failures or 
natural disasters. How to model the problem realistically and meanwhile maintain 
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